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Abstract. This paper explores the possibility of grounding human behavior in a social space 
and characterizing it as a rational expressive, norm-guided behavior based on 
institutionalized dispositions under bounded rationality. For this purpose, we first review 
critically the three major theories of cultural evolution, namely, Adam Smith's theory of 
moral sentiments, Veblen's theory of leisure class, and Bourdieu's theory of habitus and 
distinction, in order to abstract the common core that provides a basis on which to build a 
theory of rational expressive behavior under the constraints of economic factors, 
information flow, social sanctions, and psychological satisfaction. In particular, the paper 
addresses the following questions: (1) how preferences turn into institutionalized 
dispositions through habituation, (2) how a socio-economic order evolves as a product of 
institutionalized dispositions, cultural capital of life-styles, expressive symbolism, and 
social norms, (3) how social want emerges as a convoluted want reconstituted of social 
facts of life-styles and desire for upper status identification, (5) how is the behavior based 
on this want related to the bounded rationality in problem solving. Our inquiry will show 
that human behavior embedded in a socio-cultural context can be characterized as rational 
behavior seeking symbolic profits defined by the social want satisfying capacity of choice 
objects, and that such rational behavior is the source of predictable behavior that can serve 
as a medium of cultural evolution. 
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1. Introduction 
ow to characterize human behavior as an expressive behavior of homo 
socius vis-à-vis social norms and cultural symbolism is an extremely 
demanding question to answer. This paper attempts to tackle this question 
by addressing (1) the evolutionary nature of a socio-economic order that is 
constituted of institutionalized dispositions, cultural capital of life-styles, shared 
expressive symbolism, and social norms, (2) the formation of social want as a 
convoluted want constitutive of (a) social facts of lifestyles of social classes and (b) 
the socially acquired desire for upper status identification, expressed as an 
emulation and avoidance pattern over such styles, (3) the rationality of human 
behavior as an expressive behavior based on the social want, and (4) the 
plausibility of norm oriented expressive behavior under conditions of bounded 
rationality in problem solving. We introduce the notion of socio-economic 
rationality that captures expressive norm-oriented behavior as rational symbolic 
profit seeking behavior. We hope our inquiry will answer Herbert Simon’s call 
(1978) for an active intercourse between economic and other social sciences,i and 
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Hodgson’s (1986) suggestion that in understanding human behavior it is not 
necessary to fall into the trap of complete voluntaristic individualism (upward 
causation) nor into the trap of the structural determinism (downward causation). 
We also answer why postulation of a utility function on an a priori basis is 
inadequate to deal with cultural-expressive behavior. 
 Given the complexity of the question, our inquiry proceeds, step by step, in the 
following sequence and organization: First, we need to review critically the three 
major theories on the institutionalization of human dispositions, namely, Adam 
Smith’s theory of moral sentiments, Veblen’s theory of the leisure class, and 
Bourdieu’s logic of practice and distinction. This is followed by a review of 
Parsons’ structural-functional theory of social actions and social systems. Because 
Parsons’ theory identifies all essential elements that are necessary for society to be 
integrated as a system of an enduring order, we believe it helps place the first three 
theories in relation to one another, particularly from the standpoint of 
institutionalization of dispositions and cultural symbolism. Rather than expressing 
these theories in general terms, we find it necessary to take this step in order to 
abstract a common core that runs through them and which helps lay a foundation 
on which to build a theory of expressive behavior under cultural symbolism. Then 
we discuss how human tastes/preferences/dispositions are shaped by social and 
cultural norms and how they constitute social want as a convoluted want 
constituted of social facts and socially inculcated desire for upper status 
identification. We propose that characterizing human behavior as a rational socio-
economic behavior requires two things: (1) socially acquired dispositions that keep 
behavior of individuals in proximity to each other to form norms and (2) a social 
space endowed with shared cultural symbolism as well as with cultural capital 
made up of accumulated knowhow of consumption which is necessary for making 
symbolic profits. Social want is not privation in the abstract since it arises only 
when an individual lives in a particular social space endowed with a particular 
symbolism. It is, therefore, not possible to identify this want with any utility 
function given a priori no matter how many arguments are entered. We argue that 
social want is a convoluted want, most usefully defined by convoluting socially 
acquired desire or proclivity for status seeking and identification and the particular 
properties of a social space that can serve the motive for emulation and avoidance. 
We show that the choice behavior under such preferences/dispositions can be 
treated as a ‘rational behavior’ in the sense of seeking symbolic profits subject to 
feasible economic means and other constraints. This proposition, therefore, 
establishes that man, whether isolated as an independent individual or embedded in 
a socio-cultural context as homo socius, is a prudent being regardless of the nature 
of underlying preferences/dispositions as long as human activities are teleological 
in nature (aiming an end). The concept of rationality, therefore, is not a patent of 
the field of economics. If man as homo socius is rational in terms of symbolic 
profit making and upper status seeking, such rationality must be mediating 
evolution of a socio-cultural system. Our paper argues that such is the logic of 
institutionalized behavior and cultural evolution. 
 Views on human behavior, unfortunately, have been split between two extreme 
poles, one that assumes that human beings are essentially homo oeconomicus, i.e., 
autonomous agents guided by rational goal orientation dictated by the principle of 
instrumental rationality, and the other that assumes that human beings are homo 
sociologicus (or homo socius), i.e., voluntary agents whose dispositions are 
socially formed and reflect society’s common normative values that hold their 
behavior within socially meaningful and acceptable bounds, and whose behavior is 
expressive in nature under cultural symbolism. These extreme views are powerful 
in their own right, but they have left a middle ground largely unexplored, in which 
the two views may be subsumed into a more general notion of rational agents. If 
we want to characterize human behavior as an expressive behavior with respect to 
cultural symbolism, we need to ask if it is possible to integrate the two poles under 
a more comprehensive view that human behavior is an expression of socially 
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acquired dispositions through use of whatever symbolic means there are in the 
context in which it is expressed. It should be mentioned that there have been new 
important lines of research that are helping bridge the gap, such as psychological 
economics started by Kahneman & Tversky (1979), rational choice sociology, and 
experimental economics and game theory, all of which are helpful in understanding 
expressive behavior. As Thaler (2000) suggested, it is time to shift our focus from 
the notion of homo oeconomicus to a more comprehensive notion of homo sapiens, 
whose distinguishing feature is the sociality and communication.ii 
 Before proceeding to a critique of the four theories, it is useful to clarify the 
position that this paper is taking. Under a sociological perspective, it is argued that 
the distinguishing feature of a socio-economic order is that the constituent 
members of society, possessing socially acquired dispositions, are guided, in their 
behavior, by common values (including rules of conduct). Economists may express 
this fact by saying that such values set the normative parameters within which 
autonomous agents behave under the principle of instrumental rationality (through 
means-end relations), whereas sociologists may go a step deeper into the 
psychological and sociological makeup of individual agents by arguing that such 
values, when internalized into their motivational structure, may form dispositions 
prone to follow a certain logic of practice that is meaningful in social and symbolic 
terms. In phenomenological terms, we can say that human beings, through their 
acts of intentionality, interpret the state of their being by understanding their 
relation to a world they find themselves in, and that if this environing world is 
endowed with certain common values and cultural symbolism, an agent’s 
interpretation of his being cannot remain aloof of them. Human activities always 
involve others. One cannot, therefore, ignore the fact that such values play a 
decisive role in governing human activities, whether in scientific endeavors, 
business transactions, or community activities. This is also true of the religious 
values as the source of faith and beliefs that ground human beings as loving and 
caring beings. Thus, to recognize that a socio-economy as an organized system is a 
spontaneous order evolving with social norms, cultural symbols, and ethical and 
religious values is only a first step toward understanding human activities as an 
intricately organized expressive behavior, not as activities that are largely 
independent of these values. It is the stand of this paper that abstracting economic 
transactions merely in terms of simple self-centered calculations, without knowing 
what 'being self-centered' really means and without accounting for on what factors 
such calculations are based, is not enough in grasping a socio-economic order as an 
integrated totality. Economic motivations that come from the principle of the in-
order-to’s of human actions become meaningful only when they are cast in the 
light of what makes man’s living in this world profitable in terms of his life-project 
to be completed. It should be reminded that the good (the end) that human actions 
aim for is intertwined with the good of society in Aristotle’s ethics. 
 With this stand, this paper starts with a critical review of the major institutional 
theories on the issue of how a socio-economic order emerges and holds together all 
categories of values: economic, social, cultural, ethical, religious, linguistic, and 
even aesthetic. This review is necessary to clarify and analyze what is meant by the 
institutionalization of common normative values as the functional foundation of a 
social system. We will show that it is the principle of institutionalization of 
dispositions that underlies the three theories, which are essentially theories of 
socio-cultural evolution. They share a similar generative principle and have a 
homological structure with differing points of emphasis. We know that Parsons and 
Bourdieu, as sociologists, are adamantly opposed to the economists’ view of 
rational behavior that reduces human agents to the level of instrumental goal-
orientation or mechanistic responses. Parsons insists in The Social System that this 
scheme of instrumental goal-orientation is not adequate in explaining social actions 
in a social system, for which institutionalization of common normative values is 
quitessential. Likewise, Bourdieu, in The Logic of Practice, is opposed to the 
economists’ description of rational agents as mechanistic responses, and, in 
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Distinction, he argues that economic variables are not enough to account for 
symbolic profits that social agents seek. Such criticisms should not be ignored, but, 
at the same time, it should be kept in mind that the disposition-based practices 
aiming at symbolic profits cannot be meaningful performed in a socio-cultural 
environment without mediation of a selective or screening principle, which implies 
that some criterion is necessary for selecting a certain object from a feasibility set. 
Although Bourdieu points to the spontaneity of practices, the difficulty of problem 
solving involved in such practices could be even more demanding than any 
straightforward problem of making a choice from a given feasibility set, if the 
practices are to be non-mechanistic and socially meaningful. This is the reason why 
the cultivation of the codes of decorum by the leisure class is time consuming - a 
virtue of consumption in Veblen's view. One may be able to choose easily what 
one likes, but, when it comes to symbolic profits, one must ponder on what would 
be the best choice to make in symbolic terms. This is why we think that the logic of 
practice may become greatly affected by the accumulated knowledge of 
economizing schemes of problem solving that can serve as socially and culturally 
meaningful heuristics. Human beings go through the process of trial and error, and 
successful experiences tend to collect momentum in solving complex problems. In 
dealing with human behavior in the context of a socio-cultural environment, it is 
necessary to go beyond the conventional dichotomy between preferences on the 
one hand and the situations in which choice making is embedded on the other, and 
to integrate the institutionalized normative values with the rationality principle that 
mandates that one select a most effective object of choice from the alternatives that 
are feasible, whether for cultural profits or social comparison or any other gain, 
without losing sight of the spontaneity of human existence and a socio-economic 
order in which this existence is intimately situated. What we intend to accomplish 
through our examination of these theories of institutionalization is, therefore, to 
bring the fact to better understanding that human beings, through their acts of 
intentionality, more particularly, through their acts of categorical intuition, 
synthesize the irreal objectivities ideationally and construct a social and cultural 
space in which the choices made are conferred with a symbolic meaning that would 
otherwise not exist.  
I need to ask for patience as the four theories are reviewed through their critical 
parts. This step is necessary in order to identify the core idea and the homological 
structure of institutionalization on which our theory of symbolic expressive 
behavior is based. We start with Adam Smith as the forerunner of the tradition of 
spontaneous order and institutionalization. 
 
2. Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments and Cultural 
Evolution 
 Adam Smith’s thesis, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) (hereafter MS), 
explains how our moral sentiments of approbation and disapprobation, combined 
with moral faculties that respect moral rules of conduct, can account for an 
evolutionary process of a harmonious economic order by instilling, in man, 
ambition and industry to accumulate wealth for the purpose of obtaining fancy 
contrivances as objects of admiration by spectators. This race of wealth 
accumulation splits the society into two ranks, high ranks (the wealthy) and low 
ranks (the poor), the former respecting such virtues as freedom, independence, and 
generosity whereas the latter respecting such virtues as prudence, justice, frugality, 
industry, and strict observance of rules. The race also gives rise to emulation and 
avoidance as the rich seeks to distance themselves from low ranks by setting a new 
fashion that avoids the meagerness with which their fashion may become 
associated when it has been emulated successfully by those of low ranks. People of 
low ranks, however, work industriously, develop sciences and arts, and produce 
innovations, which will enable the economy to produce fancy contrivances that are 
acquired by the wealthy in setting their fashion. The race, through differentiation of 
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classes and virtues, produce employment opportunities necessary to feed the 
multitude while the economy becomes more extensive in its order. The principle of 
custom and habit, as an extensive principle, mediates the exact process of evolution 
by habituating man’s tastes and aesthetic sense of beauty and propriety of all 
objects of choice, modes, arts, and judgments. Everything falls into the hand of 
Providence.   
 Adam Smith holds that if man is only interested in the direct (raw) utility of 
anything, the economy does not grow as an extended order. There simply won’t be 
enough force to drive an economy. To make this point, Adam Smith starts Part IV 
of The Theory of Moral Sentiments with an observation that the utility is one of the 
principal sources of beauty and that objects of happy contrivance produced by the 
art of production are valued more than the end for which they are produced and 
that the whole merit of such objects consists in attaining them, which is worth all 
the toil and the adjustment of the means to acquire them (MS, 257-258). A refined 
watch is a good example, as what interests man is not so much the convenience and 
the knowledge that it affords as the refined nature of the good itself (MS, 259). But, 
this subtle difference makes an enormous difference in the way the economy 
develops its order. The raw utility that articles of conveniency yield is limited and 
does not justify the toil needed to attain it. But if such articles become objects of 
admiration by spectators (acquire symbolic values), the merit of acquiring them 
takes on a different meaning, and man’s striving for this end collects a force that 
perpetuates and drives economic development. When a poor man is exposed to the 
articles of conveniency displayed by the rich, there arises in him ambition to be 
wealthy by being industrious. Man’s endeavors to acquire talents, professions, 
better jobs and his willingness to bear the required burden of hardship and sacrifice 
all originate in this ambition, although those observable articles of vanity sought so 
earnestly do not yield much of the conveniency dreamed of, in comparison with 
cheaper articles of similar utility (MS,259-261). The principal cause of this quest 
for elegant contrivances as means of happiness is rooted in man’s proclivity to pay 
more attention to the sentiments of other people for his mode of living and in 
man’s belief that such fancy contrivances are objects of admiration and applaud of 
other people, although this belief is separate from how much such goods contribute 
to the happiness of their masters (MS, 261-262). The real satisfaction, with all its 
implications, is confounded into a view that man’s unceasing endeavors in the 
economy that is turning out fancy goods of contrivance and man’s ambition to win 
admiration of other people by becoming wealthy and obtain such goods are all part 
of the harmonious movement of the system.iii 
 The economy is thus viewed as a grand harmonious order. People find a real 
source of satisfaction in fancy goods of contrivance as objects of admiration, the 
system arranges itself beautifully by keeping people industrious, wealth is sought 
as something noble, and the economy expands as a harmonious order with 
increasing opportunities of employment for the multitude. There is nothing 
intrinsic about such confounding of satisfaction, beauty, order, and nobility. 
Although it may be a deception, this harmony keeps the industry of mankind in 
perpetual motion and the economy as an extending order. This industry and 
ambition is the source of all sorts of innovations that embellish our life and push 
the frontiers of sciences and arts. The order of the economy never loses its 
harmony as the wealthy, whose stomach is far less than their desires for 
conveniency, consume only a small but the most precious portion of the output 
produced in the economy while the rest trickles down to lower levels to feed those 
who actually produce the trinkets and baubles enjoyed by the great. Our love for 
the beauty of order and elegant contrivances also permeates our desire for better 
institutions that promote the public welfare. Thus, the moral sentiments for 
approbation rouse man’s ambition and industry, spawn innovations, promote 
development of sciences and arts, adore accumulation of wealth, extend the order 
of an economy with the employment of the multitude, and advance better 
institutions for public welfare, all part of Providence that sees to it that the entire 
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system be kept in a harmonious movement without leaving any part unaccounted 
(MS, 262-268). 
 Elaborating on the origin of ambition and the distribution of ranks (Ch. II, 
Section II, Part I, 70-83), Adam Smith argues that because we are disposed to 
sympathize more with joy than with sorrow, we want to demonstrate our riches, 
conceal our poverty, pursue riches, and avoid poverty. Our ambition is to acquire 
refined articles and to derive from this acquisition the advantage of sympathy, 
complacency, and approbation from the spectator. This vanity is only founded on 
our belief that we are exposed to the attention and the approbation of other people. 
It is this observation and admiration by other people which renders greatness to the 
objects of envy, and compensates all the toil, anxiety, and loss of leisure that is 
forfeited in its acquisition (MS, 70-72). 
 Despite the grand beauty of a harmonized system, Adam Smith is quick to point 
out that our disposition to admire the rich and neglect the poor causes our moral 
sentiments to be corrupted, although this corruption is part of the great order. There 
are two roads man can take in gaining the admiration of mankind, either by taking 
the road to wisdom and virtue or by taking the road to wealth and greatness. 
Wisdom and virtue are admired only by a select few, but wealth and greatness are 
admired by the multitude. It is by taking the latter road that our moral sentiments 
become corrupted, but this corruption is not uniform. It splits between the inferior 
and superior stations of life. In the inferior stations in which most men find 
themselves, men develop the virtues of prudence and justice in seeking 
professional abilities and in observing the rules of justice, which are reinforced by 
the sentiments of neighbors. In the superior stations of life, however, where the 
success depends on winning the favor of the proud and vain superiors, the great 
virtues are tamed by the external graces of a man of fashion. But, because of man’s 
disposition to imitate the living of the rich, men of the superior stations distance 
themselves from men of the lower stations by setting a fashion or a decorum, with 
all vices and follies to go with it.  Men of the lower stations emulate this fashion as 
a noble object of admiration. In this way, the fashion set by the rich, through envy, 
takes most men away from the road to the great virtues, as they remain ambitious at 
emulating this fashion, although it is the illusion that it would give the successful 
emulator the joy of a more generous living and earn the respect and admiration of 
the spectator. Those at the lower stations of life are not all miserable, as they, by 
their virtues of prudence and justice, work with diligence, produce innovations, and 
develop sciences and arts, which are all essential in keeping the economy going as 
an extending order. The point is that their moral sentiments are affected with the 
ambition to earn the respect and the admiration of the spectator. It is such affected 
dispositions that are the source of man’s industry. Thus, the economy as a 
harmonious order thrives as a perpetual race to get the greatness and power of 
wealth. Corrupt as man’s virtues may be, such corruption is part of Providential 
Guidance. From the standpoint of evolution, it is important to note that society 
bifurcates into the upper and lower stations, which turn the moral sentiments into 
different dispositions and cultivate different virtues, one for consumption and the 
other for production. Since such dispositions and virtues become what are expected 
of men belonging to the different stations, they acquire the moral force, and, in this 
sense, can be regarded as institutionalized dispositions (MS, 84-90). 
 While our moral sentiments become corrupted, Adam Smith holds that how our 
moral sentiments are shaped is affected by the principles of custom and fashion, or 
by the principle of habituation, which can cause different judgments of beauty to 
emerge in different ages and nations. Repeated observation of different things 
habituates our mind to appreciate similar connections in similar situations, and 
such habituation gives rise to our custom of connecting different things, with the 
sense of the propriety or the impropriety of varied combinations of things. Under 
the principle of habituation, a fashion, initiated by men of high ranks of life, 
through repeated observation, acquires the sense of being something genteel and 
magnificent. As this fashion is emulated by men of inferior ranks, it acquires the 
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character of meanness and awkwardness and loses its grace it once had. Custom 
and fashion are an extensive principle as their influence covers all objects of 
choice, be they modes of dress, furniture, poetry, music, architecture, manners, and 
so on. They even influence our judgments of the beauty of natural objects, as in our 
appreciation of a certain middle or the general pattern with respect to the features 
of things, animate or inanimate. Thus, custom and fashion habituates our mind to 
see, or, even to judge, certain things as beautiful or appropriate and other things as 
distasteful and inappropriate. In Adam Smith’s view, how our mind sees certain 
things in certain ways, with the sense of propriety or impropriety, is not something 
that can be assumed given, but rather a product of custom habituating and 
impressing our mind to see things in certain ways, although custom is not the 
exclusive principle of beauty. If custom and habit permeates our sense of beauty 
and propriety of things, there is no reason why it does not influence, in some way, 
our sense of beauty on human conduct. But, this influence will be limited because 
the virtues of the inferior ranks of people such as parsimonious frugality, painful 
industry, and rigid adherence to rules are viewed as mean and disagreeable, while 
they are also connected with the abject, cowardly, ill-natured, lying, and pilfering 
nature of their disposition. On the principle of custom and habit, Adam Smith adds 
that the golden mean of virtues observed in those who are most esteemed, being 
emulated by many, will guide the course of the development of the propriety of 
character and behavior. Admitting that custom and habit affect what is regarded as 
agreeable, appropriate, or beautiful, in seeing things or in determining conduct, 
such influences are only limited to the propriety or impropriety of particular usages 
of our virtues or behavior, although good morals may be thwarted and seemingly 
immoral particular actions may be accepted as lawful and blameless. But, again, 
this is all part of the order under the guidance of Providence (MS, 288-304). 
 We should not ignore the fact that while Adam Smith draws a picture of a grand 
system of harmony that originates in our moral sentiments, he does not forget to 
place an equal emphasis on the importance of the general rules of conduct in 
preserving the order of our society. He holds that man is endowed with a particular 
power of perception by which to distinguish the beauty and the deformity of 
passions and affections, and with a special faculty of the moral sense by which to 
judge their own conduct. It is by the power of this perception and this moral sense 
that man, by observing the conduct of other people, forms certain proper rules of 
conduct. These rules are not determined by any a priori examination of what 
actions are to be approved or disapproved by philosophical reasoning, but rather 
they are based on our own experiences of what has been approved by our moral 
faculties and our natural sense of merit and propriety. Custom and habit may 
influence the particular usages of our virtues or behavior, but man’s conduct itself 
has to observe the proper rules, although such rules themselves cannot escape the 
influence of custom and habit because these principles habituate our sense of 
beauty and propriety. Adam Smith holds fast that this regard for the general rules 
of morality is, as man’s duty, a principle of the greatest consequence in human life, 
and only by which man’s actions can be directed. This principle separates ‚a man 
of principle and honour‛ from ‚a worthless fellow‛. Without a reverence for the 
rules of morality, the very existence of human society would crumble into nothing. 
Adam Smith says that the sense of duty is too important to the happiness of 
mankind to leave it to the slow and uncertain artificial reasoning and philosophy, 
while noting that religion has already given sanction to these rules. The observance 
of the rules of conduct is not without its own recompense; unlike man’s industry, 
prudence, and circumspection which have their recompense of success, wealth, or 
honors, the practice of truth, justice, and humanity has the recompense of 
confidence, esteem, and love of others. Smith holds that the observance of the 
general rules of morality can only be supported by the strongest motives of self-
interest, which includes both self-regarding and other-regarding. In fact, one 
without the other is destructive of its foundation. Thus, Adam Smith argues that 
our natural power of perception, our moral faculties, and our strongest motives of 
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self-interest (both self-regarding and other-regarding) will, through experience, be 
able to grasp moral rules of conduct by which to guide our conduct in whatever 
circumstances we find ourselves, and that these rules keep the human existence in 
harmony with the entire system (MS, 223-241). 
 This is the grand order of society as envisioned by Adam Smith. It is a view that 
connects all aspects of human existence (tastes, dispositions, judgments, 
production, sciences, arts, innovations, ambition, industry, employment, the sense 
of beauty, nobility, and propriety, and what not) into a unified harmonious order 
under moral sentiments for approbation and moral faculties. While the principle of 
custom and habit shapes the course of evolution of this grand order, it is the motive 
to emulate the life-styles of the superior stations of life (and to avoid those of the 
lower stations) that drives an economy to an ever greater order with moral 
sentiments turning into two different dispositions and virtues, one for consumption 
and the other for production and innovation. Adam Smith’s theory was inherited by 
Thorstein Veblen, who puts forth another similar evolutionary theory under the title 
of The Theory of the Leisure Class (1925) (hereafter LC) with the moral 
sentiments replaced with an instinct of workmanship that again turns into two 
diametrically opposed dispositions and virtues. We now review his theory. 
 
3. Veblen’s Theory of the Leisure Class: The Canon of 
Conspicuous Waste 
 Rather than starting with moral sentiments, Veblen starts with an instinct of 
workmanship, which is nothing other than man’s acquired taste for productive and 
effective work and distaste for the contrary. It should not be identified with an 
instinct in the deep psyche, since it is an aptitude to be able to separate what is 
productive and what is futile, which is a capacity socially acquired. It is this 
instinct that influences the apperceptive activity of our mind and habituates our 
tastes and the sense of beauty, nobility, and propriety. It cultivates our sense of 
beauty by blending the generic and the honorific beauty, and by this blended 
cultivation our tastes conjoin the brute efficiency and the honorific reputability. 
Through the succeeding phases of cultural and industrial development, there 
emerges a leisure class with the canon of conspicuous waste as its dominant mode 
of tastes. This canon then serves as a selective principle that screens innovative 
goods for their serviceability on the measure of honorific reputability. Veblen’s 
theory is an evolutionary theory that accounts for the emergence of an invidious 
culture that adores honorific waste as an expression of the life of leisure. It is 
derived from a socially acquired aptitude for productive work, called the instinct of 
workmanship, which steers the course of socio-cultural evolution through 
habituation of the apperceptive activity of mind as well as through circumvention 
of the sense of beauty. 
 The instinct of workmanship works itself out through stages of socio-cultural 
evolution, starting with a peaceable barbarian/savagery stage in which the incentive 
and the scope of emulation is still limited, through a predatory phase in which 
exploit and acquisition by war and seizure is praised more than industrial 
employment, and to a quasi-peaceable phase of an incipient organization of 
industry and private property, in which accumulation of wealth becomes a common 
basis of esteem in the community with the highest honors still being granted on 
predatory or quasi-predatory efficiency in war or statecraft. The acquisition of 
wealth, as the source of popular esteem and self-respect, now sets in motion in this 
stage a process of the struggle for a higher relative standing against competitors. 
The instinct of workmanship is thus channeled into a straining race for pecuniary 
achievement (LC, 36-40). 
 The struggle for the attainment of pecuniary reputability works in different 
directions for different classes. While this struggle takes the form of increased 
diligence and parsimony for those whose actions are tied to field of productive 
efficiency, the dominant incentive of the superior pecuniary class is the gaining of 
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abstention from productive work, which is regarded debasing to a spiritual human 
life. In the predatory phase, particularly, productive work becomes associated with 
a mark of weakness, subjection, and inferiority. Thus, the life of leisure establishes 
itself as the most definitive evidence of pecuniary achievement and reputability. 
Pecuniary emulation of this exemption from labor continues to inhibit the habits of 
industry and thrift. Wealth as a direct meritorious measure of social standing is 
now taken over by insistence on the exemption from productive labor. The life of 
the leisure class, in this way, becomes institutionalized with all its honorific and 
meritorious requisites (LC, 41-45). 
 With the leisure class comes refinement of a code of decorum (refined tastes, 
manners, and habits of life). While manners, both as a symbolic expression of the 
relation of status and as a sign of gentility, are intrinsically good, the ulterior 
economic ground of a code of decorum lies in the honorific character of leisure, 
and demonstration of proficiency in it, as the ‚voucher of a life of leisure‛. Thus, 
conspicuous leisure grows into a detailed code of decorum as well as into 
discriminate tastes for the decorous nature of consumption (LC, 50). Personal 
service also becomes an important economic institution for consumption purposes. 
Initially leisure is performed vicariously by housewives and menials for their 
masters, but as competition for conspicuous leisure gains in scope, there emerges a 
subsidiary leisure class comprised of servants of various grades with a division of 
labor among them. These servants spend vicariously the leisure of their masters or 
corporate households all for the demonstration of the pecuniary reputability of the 
leisure class (LC, 56-59). 
 Parallel to the development of the institution of conspicuous leisure is the 
beginning of differentiation in consumption based on pecuniary strengths in the 
earlier quasi-peaceable stage. As competition for conspicuous leisure becomes 
increasingly strenuous, gentlemen of leisure turns to consumption as another means 
of demonstration of their pecuniary reputability, seizing those innovations that turn 
out more elaborate goods for consumption. They cultivate their tastes and learn to 
discriminate the noble from the ignoble among goods for consumption. How to live 
a life of ostensible leisure, by demonstrating refined tastes for manners and through 
consumption of appropriate goods, becomes just as important as demonstrating 
conspicuous leisure. Thus, conspicuous leisure and conspicuous consumption 
become the social norm of the leisure class (LC, 60-64). As wealth accumulates 
and as conspicuous leisure and consumption is increasingly refined, the leisure 
class becomes differentiated with a system of ranks and grades, which is furthered 
by inheritance of wealth and gentility. With the proper leisure class at the top, there 
emerges hierarchical classes of impecunious or half-caste gentlemen of leisure with 
various degrees of dependence on the upper classes. 
 Veblen’s view of the life process in an invidious pecuniary culture is most 
succinctly described in the following passage. 
The accepted standard of expenditure in the community or in the class to 
which a person belongs largely determines what his standard of living will 
be. It does this directly by commending itself to his common sense as right 
and good, through his habitually contemplating it and assimilating the 
scheme of life in which it belongs; but it does so also indirectly through 
popular insistence on conformity to the accepted scale of expenditure as a 
matter of propriety, under pain of disesteem and ostracism. To accept and 
practice the standard of living which is in vogue is both agreeable and 
expedient, commonly to the point of being indispensable to personal comfort 
and to success in life. The standard of living of any class, so far as concerns 
the element of conspicuous waste, is commonly as high as the earning 
capacity of the class will permit–with a constant tendency to go higher. The 
effect upon the serious activities of men is therefore to direct them with great 
singleness of purpose to the largest possible acquisition of wealth, and to 
discountenance work that brings no pecuniary gain. At the same time the 
effect on consumption is to concentrate it upon the lines which are most 
patent to the observers whose good opinion is sought; while the inclinations 
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and aptitudes whose exercise does not involve a honorific expenditure of time 
or substance tend to fall into abeyance through disuse (LC, 86). 
 In an invidious culture, man, as a socially acquired character, must be disposed 
to seek as much wealth as possible and to express consumption that this wealth 
affords using signs of conspicuous waste. Such dispositions not only optimize the 
responses made by the critics and hence aid the attainment of the social esteem 
within the earning capacity of the individual, but also avoid the negative sanction 
of being outcast if expressed consumption deviates too much from the norm of the 
standard of living most agreeable to the class of his belonging. Thus, the expressive 
behavior based on institutionalized dispositions is oriented to the norms of the 
relevant critics. All this implies that an invidious culture is made possible only by 
preferences turning into dispositions that are institutionalized, in that what man is 
disposed to do meets the criterion of being expedient to his goal and agreeable to 
the critics. At the same time, such culture must also be endowed with cultural 
symbolism that is shared across all social classes, so that the critics agree on what 
is appropriate and what is disagreeable. How do such dispositions emerge? The 
answer lies in the formation of habits of thought. 
 In Veblen’s thought, habits of thought are an organic complex in conscious life, 
in which the economic interest is not isolated from all other interests. The canon of 
honorific waste traverses the canons of moral conduct, beauty, utility, ritualistic 
fitness, and even scientific sense of truth in the community. The institution of the 
sacredness of private property is no exception; it is traversed by the habit of 
accumulating wealth for its reputable value of conspicuous consumption (LC, p. 
88-89). Likewise the popular sense of what is useful and beautiful and what is 
serviceable in consumable goods is influenced by the canons of reputability. This is 
how the beautiful and the honorific meet and blend. It is, therefore, no longer easy 
to separate the intrinsic beauty from the honorific service quality. The beauty of an 
object, under this blending, subsumes both features, its expensiveness and its 
beautiful features. Such is the case with many consumable articles such as dress 
and household furniture (LC, 95-97). The notion of beauty in this blended sense is 
not uniform among different classes. Just as classes are differentiated with their 
own norms of reputability, so are matters of taste allowing for diverse views on 
what is beautiful and honorific. But, the code of reputability of the class of one’s 
belonging tells which objects are suitable for honorific consumption. In the 
language of behavioral economics today, where the consuming critic is located in 
the social status ladder defines a reference point from which emulation and 
avoidance takes place. 
Long and close habituation makes the mind to unfold its apperceptive activity 
of perceiving beauty in certain directions. While the economic interest in the 
constitution of beauty of an object is focused on its efficiency in facilitating the 
material ends of life, the canons of beauty are circumvented to appreciate reputably 
wasteful expenditure as well as to satisfy our sense of useful and beautiful so as to 
turn such canons into the sense of novelty that perceives those things that combine 
ingenuity, pecuniary waste, and economic efficiency as novel (LC, 109-110). 
Veblen’s evolutionary view of socio-cultural development thus draws on (a) the 
apperceptive activity of the mind, (b) long habituation of this activity in an 
invidious culture, and (c) formation of the sense of novelty through blending of the 
generic and the honorific beauty. 
 The serviceability of goods can no longer escape the impact of this sense. 
Because consumption is the most effective means for emulation in an invidious 
culture, consumable goods are now invested not only with the qualities to service 
the material ends of human life but also with the qualities that service the end of 
emulating social classes of higher statuses through demonstration of the ability to 
pay. The goods serving this end must show adequate marks of honorific waste 
beyond the brute efficiency. If consumers are habituated to look for the marks of 
honorific conspicuousness, producers of goods naturally direct their effort to 
meeting this demand. (LC, 112-113). 
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 The effectiveness of goods as a means of emulation is no longer independent of 
a particular social context in which man makes his choices, for goods effective as 
such means under one culture are not as effective in another. Veblen is here 
breaking the conventional dichotomy between values/preferences and choice 
objects; how one values choice objects for their effectiveness as a means of 
invidious comparison is intimately bound to the social context in which such 
valuation is made, which is to say that preferences are convoluted with the facts of 
social and cultural styles of living to be emulated or avoided. One must see goods 
and know their features including how vogue they are across social classes before 
one can evaluate their serviceability and effectiveness as means of emulation.  
 The canon of taste for the honorific or the wasteful is so forcefully ingrained in 
the mind of the consumers that they make it their habit to look upon wasteful 
expensiveness as the measure of honorific decency and to degrade cheap things as 
dishonorable. So, any retrogression from the standard of living worthy in this 
respect is felt as a grievous violation of human dignity (LC, 112). But, the canon of 
taste for waste does not imply that the wasteful goods lack evidence of skillful 
workmanship or ingenuity; it is quite the contrary. Skillful workmanship or 
ingenuity is normally the ground on which to screen goods selectively for their 
honorific serviceability. In this sense, the canon of conspicuous waste works as a 
selective principle, rather than as a generative principle. Whenever innovative 
articles or methods are introduced, the canon of conspicuous waste serves to select 
such forms as are suitable as effective means of invidious comparison (LC, 118). 
Veblen is clear on this point: 
The position of machine products in the civilized scheme of consumption 
serves to point out the nature of the relation which subsists between the 
canon of conspicuous waste and the code of proprieties in consumption. 
Neither in matters of art and taste proper, nor as regards the current sense of 
the serviceability of goods, does this canon act as a principle of innovation 
or initiative. It does not go into the future as a creative principle which 
makes innovations and adds new items of consumption and new elements of 
costs. The principle in question is, in a certain sense, a negative rather than a 
positive law. It is a regulative rather than a creative principle. It very rarely 
initiates or originates any usage or custom directly.  Its action is selective 
only. … The law of conspicuous waste does not account for the origin of 
variations, but only for the persistence of such forms as are fit to survive 
under its dominance. It acts to conserve the fit, not to originate the 
acceptable. Its office is to prove all things and to hold fast that which is good 
for its purpose (LC, 118). 
 Veblen’s thought that the canon of pecuniary waste is not a creative principle 
but rather a negative and regulative principle follows from his position that it is 
from the instinct of workmanship (man's taste for productive work and distaste for 
futile effort) that man’s sense of beauty, art, proper conduct, and the propriety of 
consumption emerges through habituation of the sense of beauty over the course of 
cultural evolution. The canon of conspicuous waste, therefore, is a product (or an 
emerged pattern of tastes) rather than a cause of innovations. But, as this passage 
implies, Veblen suggests that the instinct of workmanship is the source of the two 
principles of cultural evolution, one positive and creative as the principle of 
innovation and production and the other negative and regulative as the principle of 
selection or surveillance. In fact, as wealth is sought and accumulated, society 
bifurcates into two classes, upper and lower, that cultivates different virtues, the 
class at the top cultivating the virtues of consumption through development of 
refined codes of decorum and the lower ones cultivating the virtues of innovation 
and production through development of arts and sciences. But, these virtues are 
rooted in the common aptitude called the instinct of workmanship. Thus, as men of 
lower stations create new and refined goods, men of higher stations evaluate and 
screen them for their serviceability to the life of honorific reputability, which is to 
be emulated across all rungs of social status. What course the cultural evolution 
actually takes, therefore, depends on the intricate working of the two principles 
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mediated by habits of thought. Veblen's theory in this respect is in close affinity 
with Adam Smith’s theory, almost identical in structure. 
 Such is Veblen’s theory of cultural evolution and the emergence of the leisure 
class and the cannon of conspicuous waste. Starting with the instinct of 
workmanship, Veblen argues how this instinct, initially working out in an 
emulative or invidious comparison between persons, (1) habituates our 
apperceptive activity to perceive beauty and our tastes for invidious comparison 
through succeeding phases of cultural development, (2) contributes to a 
hierarchical differentiation of social classes, (3) brings forth the institution of 
private property to honor accumulation of wealth as a basis of esteem, (4) 
cultivates our sense of what is beautiful by blending the generic and the honorific 
beauty, thereby forming conjoined tastes for the brute efficiency and the honorific 
reputability, and (5) solidifies the canon of conspicuous waste as a selective 
principle that screens innovative goods and methods for the evidence of their 
honorific serviceability. Particularly important is Veblen's notion that through long 
habituation the canons of conspicuous waste traverse the canons of beauty to turn 
them into the sense of novelty which guides our discrimination of consuming 
articles for both ingenuity and pecuniary waste. It is a theory of the emergence, the 
evolution, and the institutionalization of the leisure class and the canon of 
conspicuous waste supporting it, but, more importantly, it is a dialectical theory of 
the instinct of workmanship and habituation setting in motion, under industrial 
growth, an evolutionary process of a cultural development, in which man's quest 
for invidious comparison and social esteem is just as important as the attainment of 
impartial well-being. It is also an evolutionary theory of the genesis of dispositions 
in the individual self, or a dynamic theory of the internalization of the norm of the 
canon of conspicuous waste into the motivational structure of the self through 
habituation. Veblen’s theory brings to light that the conventional economic theory, 
whose premise is that preferences are given, is incomplete as an account of human 
behavior in a socio-cultural context in which the proclivity to gain in social status 
and esteem incessantly seeks and finds its new expression through access to novel 
routes to pecuniary reputability. Moreover, Veblen’s theory provides an excellent 
example of the general proposition that the linkage between actions of individual 
persons under cultural influences and the emergence of cultural patterns cannot be 
understood fully without analyzing how tastes or the sense of beauty are shaped by 
cultural norms and how such norms are reproduced dynamically through voluntary 
actions of individuals. 
 In the eyes of Parsons’ dynamic theorem of sociology (to be taken up shortly), 
one can think of Veblen’s theory as an evolutionary theory of institutionalization of 
dispositions and the resulting expressive behavior, in which industrial growth plays 
a critical role of turning out innovative goods and methods for invidious 
comparison. With the permeation of the invidious culture, the class at the top sets 
the standards to be emulated by the lower classes, with varying attitudes toward 
work and frugality. Once such standards are assimilated throughout society, 
different standards are created and set by the highest class again, thereby setting in 
motion an endless process of emulation and avoidance. In Parsons’ terms, the 
common normative values in Veblen’s theory are the values of status-seeking 
emulation for the purpose of invidious comparison and demonstration. In order for 
such values to acquire a motivational force, they must be introjected into the 
motivational structure of an individual; in this way, emulation becomes an ego-
ideal, a fusion of one’s desire and a moral force of being legitimated in the 
evaluative judgment of other people. It is this institutionalization of the normative 
value of emulation that brings forth an integration of a social system through a 
network of roles and statuses. 
 We next turn to Bourdieu, whose logic of practice and distinction is closely 
related to the theories of Adam Smith and Veblen. First, we review this logic, 
which will be followed by his theory of distinction and lifestyles. 
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4. Bourdieu's Logic of Practice and Habitus 
 In Logic of Practice (1990) (hereafter LP), Bourdieu proposes a theory of 
practice as practice, which has its position between two polar opposites: objective 
idealism (or what may be called positivist materialism) on the one pole, which 
essentially views the social relationships as objective relationships that can be 
obtained and ordered in the form of knowledge of the objective structure, and 
subjectivism, on the other pole, which consists in abstaining from any account of 
the social world from the viewpoint of objective necessity. Bourdieu insists that the 
objects of knowledge are not passively recorded but rather actively constructed 
under the principle of construction he named the habitus, which is a durable system 
of structured as well as structuring dispositions (LP, 52). Veblen turned to the 
habituation of the apperception of beauty and of tastes for invidious comparison in 
the formation of the canon of honorific waste and the sense of novelty, and Adam 
Smith also held that the habit and custom play an important role in shaping the 
sense for agreeable, appropriate, and beautiful things. In Bourdieu, the site at 
which man’s activities unfold as habituated activities is now captured by the notion 
of dispositions that structure the environing world with their own structure. 
 According to Bourdieu, building a theory of practice calls for returning to the 
very site, the habitus, where the dialectic of practice, ‚the dialectic of the opus 
operantum and the modus operandi‛ takes place (LP, 52). With this stance, 
Bourdieu defines the habitus as systems of durable and transposable dispositions 
that are predisposed to function as structuring structures for practices as well as for 
representations without any conscious effort at aiming them, and which can act as a 
system of cognitive and motivating structures in the constitution of the practical 
world as the world of a pre-realized or pre-conditioned ends and means, all borne 
of a particular set of conditions of existence. Habitus is, therefore, a familiar site 
inculcated by what the objective conditions hold in terms of the probabilities, 
impossibilities, freedoms, necessities, opportunities, and prohibitions. It is a virtue 
created by internalizing the external conditions, hence becomes the source of the 
principle of the continuity and regularity in the social world. (LP, 53-54). Bourdieu 
is, therefore, critical of the dichotomy on which the neoclassical economics is 
based, namely, the separation between external constraining conditions and the 
preferences that are internally born.  For him, this principle of continuity and 
regularity must find its source ultimately in the habitus-dispositions, a systematic 
site which mirrors the external conditions of existence. 
 The habitus is not limited to the logic of practice on the plane of everyday 
choices.  It also works as the generative source of thinking, perceiving, and acting 
in particular social and historical conditions of its production. Thus, the habitus is 
an embodied, internalized, but forgotten history of past practices, a spontaneity in 
the unconscious, which forgets history while its objective structures leave their 
imprints in the quasi-natures of habitus. It is spontaneity without consciousness or 
will (LP, 56). Bourdieu states this in strong terms:   
Thus the dualistic vision that recognizes only the self-transparent act of 
consciousness or the externally determined thing has to give to the real logic 
of action, which brings together two objectifications of history, 
objectification in bodies and objectification in institutions or, which amounts 
to the same things, two states of capital, objectified and incorporated, through 
which a distance is set up from necessity and its urgencies. This logic is seen 
in paradigmatic form in the dialectic of expressive dispositions and instituted 
means of expression (morphological, syntactic and lexical instruments, 
literary genres, etc.) which is observed in the intentionless investion of 
regulated improvisation (LP, 56-57). 
Thus, habitus is of critical important to the working of an institution including 
an economy, which requires that it be durably objectified in the logic as well as in 
bodies so as to recognize and comply with the demands placed on practices 
voluntarily (LP, 57-58).  
The habitus is also a source of a common-sense world through formation of 
consensus on the meaning of practices and the world. Practices within the habitus, 
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therefore, are objectively harmonized and mutually adjusted without any conscious 
reference to a norm or explicit coordination. Similar conditions of existence 
produce homogenous class habitus, which harmonizes practices with little 
conscious coordination (LP, 58-59). On collective action, however, Bourdieu 
warns against conceiving such action by drawing an analogy with individual action 
of its own autonomous logic of mobilization. The relationship between class 
habitus and individual habitus is distinguished by separating the non-individualized 
(identical, impersonal, and interchangeable) part of internalized subjective 
structures from the singularity of the trajectories of individual dispositions, and this 
relationship is characterized as one of homology (diversity within homogeneity) in 
which the systems of dispositions of individuals who belong to the same class are 
viewed as structural variants to one another (LP, 60). This distinction becomes 
important when the society is divided into different social classes whose members 
share similar dispositions for liking and disliking as well as for doing and not doing 
vis–à–vis an environing world of their own construction.  
 How stable is habitus then? Individual dispositions owe their singularity to the 
sequence of irreducible past experiences, and such dispositions are subjected to the 
dialectic between the constancy and stability as new experiences are sought, which 
necessarily brings new information that threatens its stability. Nonetheless, if this 
dialectic is dominated by earlier and accumulated experiences, the defense 
mechanism may reject information that threatens the stability and avoids further 
exposure to such information. But, for this mechanism to work, habitus needs 
information to tell which information is to be avoided for its stability. If the class 
distinctions or the life-styles of different classes are defined by privation relative to 
what other classes have, it inevitably follows that the habitus belonging to a given 
class must be aware of what it does not have, which implies that the class must 
possess information that could threaten its constancy. As Bourdieu focuses on the 
self-fulfilling nature of the habitus, the problem of this paradox about the unchosen 
principle of all choices is solved by saying that the avoidance strategies or, more 
fundamentally, the underlying schemes of perception are an unwilling non-
conscious product borne by the conditions of existence. But, to the extent any class 
consciousness must be aware how the class of one’s belonging differs from other 
classes, Bourdieu’s habitus begs a difficult question as to how information from 
various sources is assessed in the mind of an individual.  In comparison, in Veblen 
and Adam Smith, class divisions and class consciousness, which are a product of 
cultural evolution, are the conditions of invidious comparison, whether for the 
purpose of winning the applaud of others or for the purpose of emulating higher 
classes under the canon of conspicuous waste. In this respect, Bourdieu's theory of 
habitus could be viewed as the ‘closing’ principle that generates classes and their 
symbolic distinctions, rather than the ‘opening’ principle that extends the socio-
economic order through innovative activities of mankind (LP, 60-61). 
 The self-fulfilling nature of habitus is emphasized still more by denying that the 
strategies of agents endowed with a habitus are oriented to their own consequences 
because they are themselves determined by the outcome of interchangeable past 
practices coinciding with their own under a structure homologous to the objective 
one. Bourdieu is, therefore, critical of the teleological description of rational agents 
interacting under perfect information of each other's preferences and competencies 
and of any description of the reactions of interacting agents as mechanistic 
responses.  According to him, the objectively organized strategies or practices that 
one employs are not the product of genuine strategic intention that scans the space 
for all possible moves; they are rather the product of the habitus, a particular 
durable relationship among the possible things between dispositions and the 
objective conditions.  The fact that such strategies have the appearance of being 
determined by anticipation of their consequences owes decisively to the fact that 
they are part of the practices that are preadapted to the objective conditions in 
which they are used so that the past is always present in them. When this adaption 
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is perfect, it gives ‚the most complete illusion of finality,‛ or ‚self-regulating 
mechanism‛ (LP, 61-62). 
 Bourdieu relates the practices borne of habitus to Max Weber’s distinction 
(1922, 1968) between a pure model of rational action under complete knowledge of 
circumstances and intentions and an anthropological description of practices for the 
reason that practices depend on specific chances that are appropriated by capital 
that an actor possesses. As Weber holds that the pure model of rational action 
cannot be regarded as an anthropological description of practice because real 
agents seldom possess the complete information and the skill to appreciate it, 
Bourdieu takes a similar stand by holding that practices depend not on the average 
chances of profit, which is an abstract and unreal notion, but on the specific 
chances that a singular agent or a class of agents possesses by virtue of its capital 
as a means of appropriation of the chances theoretically available to all. Thus, 
Bourdieu is critical of economic theory which acknowledges only the rational 
responses of a universal agent to potential opportunities expressed in average 
chances, for the reason that such a practice converts the immanent law of the 
economy into the norm of proper behavior. He emphasizes that the rational habitus 
or rational dispositions themselves can only be acquired under certain social 
conditions as a product of particular economic conditions defined by economic and 
cultural capital. The art of estimation, anticipation, or risk taking on the possible 
against the probable is made possible by the dispositions acquired in social 
conditions (LP, 63-64). Bourdieu’s criticism and Weber’s distinction are important 
when we try to make sense out of choices made by agents who are subject to all 
sorts of limiting conditions consciously or unconsciously. But, if the notion of 
rationality is lifted from the stringent requirements that Weber had in mind, it can 
be turned into a more formal concept relating only to the fact that one chooses what 
one prefers most or is predisposed to like most from any feasible set of alternatives 
whether preferences are determined by habitus or idiosyncratic. In this paper, we 
will attempt to formalize this abstract notion of rationality to show that human 
choice behavior can be characterized as rational behavior that selects the best 
choice from any set of alternatives, however this set may be constrained and 
whatever profits are sought by this selection, idiosyncratic utility or symbolic 
profits with respect to cultural symbolism. 
 Furthermore, on the pre-emptive rights on the future, Bourdieu holds that such 
rights cannot be appropriated without the projection of the power relations that are 
present; according to him, they are the power relations of the present projected into 
the future through appropriate chances, from which dispositions at the present are 
governed. This is how Bourdieu sees the teleology of human actions under habitus.  
What he sees is the relationship between the habitus and the state of the chances 
offered in the social world, which is dictated by a relation to power. In this sense, 
habitus is ‘the principle of a selective perception of the indices’ for confirmation 
and reinforcement of itself; it, therefore, makes itself an accomplice by reading in 
the future what is probable in its social space and thereby brings about what it can 
effectively anticipate. In Bourdieu’s view, the habitus is not a creative principle 
that transforms itself by going beyond the probable since it is already restrained by 
its social conditions, but rather a self-fulfilling or self-confirming principle that 
mediates the relationship between the habitus (with its temporal structure and 
disposition) and what the social world holds objectively, while the patterns of 
responses are preadapted to the objective conditions that are homologous to the 
already familiar conditions of its production. It serves, therefore, as a selective 
principle that confirms and reinforces its effective demand, not as a creative 
principle (LP, 64-65). 
 
5. Bourdieu’s Theory of Distinction and Life-Styles 
 In Distinction (1984) (hereafter D), Bourdieu turns to the implications of the 
logic of practice for distinction and life-styles. He first affirms the legitimacy of an 
institutional approach to sociological investigations of the social space, by 
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asserting that the question of what the social space is should be raised within this 
space itself.  This social space is then structured by a generative principle called the 
habitus, whose systematicity and transportability is assured by the fact that it is 
both a structuring structure (modus operandi) and a structured structure (opus 
operatum), and that the internalization of the habitus in the mind of agents becomes 
the source of life-styles supported by a distribution of symbolic capital and power 
in the social space. Thus, Bourdieu’s notion of habitus contains, in a 
complementary manner, both the meaning-giving acts of agents living in it and a 
coherent complex of the products of such acts. In the language of Bourdieu's 
theory, Veblen's habituated mind that sees the environing world in a certain way 
can be thought of as a structuring structure, and his notion of habituated canons of 
invidious pecuniary comparison (his selective principle that has resulted from the 
instinct of workmanship through a long history of habituation and evolution, and 
which operates on the space of the symbolic products that meet the tastes for 
invidious comparison) can be regarded as a structured structure. Likewise, Adam 
Smith's notion of the mind that is habituated to see the environing system as a 
harmonious movement and to act on the moral sentiments for approbation and 
disapprobation can be thought of as a structuring structure, and the space of those 
differentiated articles, both of ordinary usage and of those of elegant contrivances, 
that satisfy our quest for approbation, can be thought of as a structured structure. 
Adam Smith’s human folly of toiling for more wealth and better contrivances 
resonates with Bourdieu's notion that the experiences in the social world belong to 
a misrecognized order of this world.   
 The habitus then becomes the source of life-styles for agents therein, by 
engendering systematic configurations of properties that are differentiated by 
differential deviations. But, the life-styles as the products of the habitus are 
recognition of an order only in the mind; they are, therefore, socially qualified sign 
systems, not an objective truth. This is an important point as it rejects any notion of 
the spontaneous generation of class consciousness. For Bourdieu, the dialectic 
between the conditions of existence and habitus takes place through life-styles and 
a distribution of symbolic capital in the plane of perceived differences established 
in the mind of agents, while the practices and products of agents of the same class 
preserve the objectivity of the habitus without any conscious effort at orchestration 
(D, 172-173).   
If the mind of agents is structured by habitus and if life-styles are the products 
structured by the habitus, what preserves the two in their structuring-structured 
relationships, or what mediates such relationships? The answer lies in the taste for 
life-styles. Bourdieu explains how taste serves as the generative formula of life-
styles and why taste is so pervasive in the social space. In his view, taste is an 
operator of mapping from the universe of objects more or less continuously 
distributed to the universe of symbolic expressions of life-style, that is, from an 
order of physical bodies to an order of symbolic distinctions. Taste in this sense 
reflects the opus operatum of the habitus. It is, moreover, an operator of mapping 
from the universe of objectively classified practices into the universe of classifying 
practices of symbolic expression. Taste in the latter sense mediates the modus 
operandi of the habitus as a systematic expression of the condition of existence 
which constitutes a life-style (D, 174-175). This is Bourdieu’s way of 
characterizing taste. Taste as an operator and as a product also constitutes an 
essential part of Adam Smith’s and Veblen’s view of socio-economic evolution. 
 He then holds that this system of a life-style, the product of internalization of 
the structure of social space, is the transformer of the necessity into the virtue of 
making appropriate choices that constitute it. For Bourdieu, therefore, preferences 
of an agent do not exist independently of the conditions of his or her existence. 
Choices and the regularities within the limits of economic feasibility are 
transformed into self-fulfilling preferences. This view of the non-mechanical 
relationship between the necessity and the virtue of the choices induced is central 
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to his position that the social space is reproduced from within itself through the 
medium of life-styles and tastes (D, 175). 
Bourdieu also claims that the generative schemes of the habitus applies 
universally across all dissimilar practices and goods of different classes, because 
the principles of oppositions and correlations constituting different systems of life-
styles are homologous to one another. The extensiveness of this homology derives 
from the fact that such systems are homologous in structure to the objective 
oppositions between class conditions. He then shows how the two principles or 
axes, economic capital and cultural capital, organize the universe of life-styles and 
govern the space of cultural consumption. That is, the dispositions and induced 
practices of different classes are differentiated by the opposition dictated by the 
extent to which economic and cultural capital are appropriated; the rich have both 
capital and the poor lack both. This two-way organization of the social space by the 
composition of economic and cultural capital brings to focus the differences in 
tastes of those who belong to the same income bracket but differ in the cultural 
capital they possess. Economic variables, therefore, are necessary, because they 
measure the distance from or the proximity to the necessity and the degree of 
freedom from the material constraint, but not sufficient to account for the human 
proclivities which look for symbolic profits of cultural consumption (D, 175-177). 
And, the taste of necessity forms the basis of a life-style only by the relationship of 
privation vis–à–vis other life-styles. In this sense, a life-style as a classificatory 
system can be as such only if it is defined by what it lacks, not by what it has (D, 
178-179). 
 Thus, Bourdieu characterizes (1) taste as a certain acquired disposition and a 
practical mastery of certain distributions, (2) the schemes of the habitus as the 
primary source of classificatory schemes working below the level of consciousness 
and language, and (3) the social agents as producers of both classifiable acts and 
acts of classification which are themselves classified. Knowledge of the social 
world has to take into account a practical knowledge of this world which preexists 
and which it must not fail to include in its object, although this knowledge has to 
be constituted against the partial and interested representations provided by 
practical knowledge (D, 466-467). Bourdieu reiterates that the knowledge of the 
social world is an act of construction through a system of internalized embodied 
schemes or social structures based on the principles of division common to all 
agents, and that such divisions are revealed in the network of common place 
oppositions that find their source in the opposition between the dominant and the 
dominated. In his view, the social order of the opposition and divisions becomes 
inscribed as principles in people's minds in constituting the image of the social 
world through the differentiated and differentiating conditionings that are 
associated with the conditions of existence (D, 471). What is important about such 
conditionings is that experiencing objective limits gives rise to a sense of limits or 
exclusion in the mind of people from what is beyond their appropriation. There is 
thus a correspondence between the real world (social structures of real divisions) 
and the thought world (the mental structures of the practical principles of division), 
and, in consequence, the relations of order that run through them inseparably are 
accepted as self-evident structures of the social world and become embodied in 
people’s schemes of cognition (miscognition). This is the origin of the logical 
conformity (Durkheim, 1915, p.17). It is this conformity that ‚makes it possible to 
act as if one knew the structure of the social world, one's place within it and the 
distances that need to be kept‛ (D, 472). 
 This logical conformity and the conservation of the social order need to be 
scrutinized carefully in the light of the Husserlian distinction between the static and 
genetic phenomenology, particularly with respect to whether the social world, 
constructed in the mind of people, is finitely closed or infinitely open. If the 
construction of the social world is a mental phenomenon that fulfills itself through 
a synthesis of single and particular forms of intentional mental process, it gives rise 
to a higher level consciousness that sees this construction just as another 
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construction and leaves a gap to be filled by a dynamic or genetic phenomenology 
in which ‚I‛ as the subject transcends itself (Husserl, 1927). Bourdieu focuses on 
the logic of practice of the habitus, with more emphasis on the static than dynamic 
aspect (although the notion of life-styles as privation indicates otherwise), while 
Veblen and Adam Smith start with certain principles, the instinct of workmanship 
or the moral sentiments of approbation, that drives the evolution of the socio-
economic order; hence, their theories are more focused on the dynamic generation 
and extension of this order. 
 We next turn to Parsons’ theory of social actions and social systems, which 
identifies all essential elements required for a collection of individual agents to be 
integrated as a social system. After this reviewing, we will place the theories of 
Adam Smith, Veblen, and Bourdieu in perspective in relation to one another, using 
Parsons’s theory as a reference framework.  
 
6. Parsons’ Vision of Social Actions and Social Systems as an 
Integrated System 
 In The Social Systems (SS hereafter), Parsons addresses the fundamental 
question of how actions of individuals as an action system and society as a social 
system become integrated as a personality-culture relationship that constitutes a 
stable order. According to Parsons, an action system of individual agents is an 
integrated system of motivational and cultural elements, and a social system is a 
structure of roles and statuses that functionally integrates social actions of 
individual agents. If the problem of the double contingency of actions of ego and 
alter is unavoidable, it follows that complementary expectations of their actions are 
required in integrating social actions of individuals and sustaining social order. 
Such expectations are possible only if the need for order is met in two dimensions, 
one in the dimension of symbolic systems that make communication possible and 
the other in the dimension of the mutuality of motivational orientation to the 
normative aspect of expectations in order to avoid the Hobbesian disorder. Order in 
the latter dimension is possible only if two further conditions are met; (1) 
individuals are oriented to common normative cultural standards under appropriate 
sanctions, and (2) actor’s motivation is integrated with such standards at the level 
of the personality. This integration is made possible only if common normative 
values are internalized into the motivational structure of individual actors, and, in 
addition, only if this internalization is mediated by the socially learned sentiments 
or value-attitudes, which constitute the need-disposition of the personality. When 
conformity to a value-orientation standard fulfills the need-disposition of an actor 
and optimizes the reactions of other actors, the normative standards are said to be 
institutionalized. 
 With this institutionalization, the conformity-deviation dimension of an actor 
acquires the gratification-deprivation dimension. The conformity to role-
expectations becomes an ego-ideal for an actor, with the moral responsibilities that 
it entails. The core dynamics of social systems consists in integrating common 
normative values with the internalized need-disposition of the constituent 
personalities. Hence, the fundamental dynamic theorem of sociology concerns how 
the degree of this integration affects the stability of a social system. For Parsons, 
this theorem is the point of reference for all dynamic analyses of social process 
(SS, 42). With this characterization of social systems and social actions, the 
phenomena of institutionalized common normative values and institutionalized 
behavior become the central concern of sociology, which explores schemes that go 
beyond rational instrumental goal-orientation. Parsons says: 
This integration of a set of common value patterns with the internalized 
need-disposition structure of the constituent personalities is the core 
phenomenon of the dynamics of social systems. That the stability of any 
social system except the most evanescent interaction process is dependent on 
a degree of such integration may be said to be the fundamental dynamic 
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theorem of sociology.  It is the major point of reference for all analysis which 
may claim to be a dynamic analysis of social process.  
It is the significance of institutional integration in this sense which lies at 
the basis of the place of specifically sociological theory in the sciences of 
action and the reasons why economic theory and other versions of the 
conceptual schemes which give predominance to rational instrumental goal-
orientation cannot provide an adequate model for the dynamic analysis of the 
social system in general terms.  (SS, 42) 
     . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
The theory of institutional behavior, which is essentially sociological 
theory, is precisely of the highest significance in social science because by 
setting the problems of social dynamics in a context of institutional structure 
and drawing the implications of the theorem of institutional integration which 
has just been stated, this theory is enabled to exploit and extend the 
knowledge of modern psychology about the non- and irrational aspects of 
motivation in order to analyze social processes.  It follows also that any 
conceptual scheme which utilizes only the motivational elements of rational 
instrumental goal-orientation can be an adequate theory only of certain 
relatively specialized processes within the framework of an institutionally 
structured social system.  (SS, 43) 
 Thus, Parsons’ view of society and individual actions is one of integration, 
between norms on the one hand and the internalized need-dispositions of 
individuals on the other. Because social and cultural values are introjected into the 
personality of actors as need-dispositions, the conformity-deviation tends to 
coincide with the gratification-deprivation, thereby making it possible for both 
society and individual actions to be integrated. That is, social and cultural values 
are reflected in the mirror image of need-dispositions of individuals with the 
conformity-deviation constantly correcting this image through gratification-
deprivation. For institutionalized action there is no dichotomy between 
preferences/values of individuals and the social system in which their actions take 
place. Thus, this intimacy between social and cultural values and need-dispositions 
(or preferences/values) of individuals marks, for Parsons, a complete departure 
from economics whose fundamental methodology is founded on rational 
instrumental goal-orientation. 
 With this paradigm of institutionalization comes one of the central questions 
that Parsons addressed, which concerns a mechanism through which a commonly 
shared system of symbols can be integrated into the personality structure of the 
actor. Parsons held that the action systems of individual actors has three foci of 
integration: (1) the individual actor, (2) the interactive system, and (3) a system of 
cultural patterning. For this integration, the psychoanalytic structure of the 
personality and the social system have to be integrated, which implies that 
sociological analysis of social systems and psychoanalysis of the personality have 
to converge around some unifying conceptual scheme that binds the personality 
structure with the social system. Parsons (1952) developed one of such schemes 
through his critique of Durkheim’s insight on the internalization of moral values 
and the limitation of Freud’s notion of superego. Freud’s superego is a 
psychological instrument by which moral values of society are introjected into the 
personality structure. It is a mechanism by which the regulative or the moral aspect 
of a common culture is transmitted to the personality structure so that it contributes 
to the maintenance of the stability of a social system under a generalized system of 
symbols. On the other hand, in Durkheim’s view (1893), society is a symbolic 
system of moral norms that guide behavior of individual actors, in which such 
norms function as the regulator of social behavior through creation of moral 
authority and moral values, so that society binds itself not by external coercion but 
by internalization of moral norms. If internalized moral values are what sustains 
society over time, and if Freud’s superego is a mechanism by which moral norms 
or values are internalized into the personality structure of constituent members of 
society, society has in its hand a mechanism of self-sustaining. In this respect, 
Freud’s postulation of superego and Durkheim’s view of society as a coherent 
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whole united by the presence of moral norms converge on one point that there is a 
personality-mediated mechanism to internalize moral values that contributes 
crucially to the creation and the sustenance of society without external coercion.iv 
 Because society is a system of interacting individuals with cognitive, cathectic, 
and evaluative orientations, and because culture is a system of generalized symbols 
and their meanings (containing the cognitive reference system, the system of 
expressive symbolism, and the system of moral standards) that mediate the 
cognitive, emotional, and evaluative components of this interaction, Parsons holds 
that the superego, as the moral regulator of emotional reactions against actions of 
others, cannot be isolated from how society is organized in these three aspects. 
Under this view, Freud’s notion of the superego suggests that internalization of the 
crucial characteristics of society into the personality structure takes place on a 
much wider scale; that is, what is morally restraining must be learned through 
social interaction guided by a cultural symbolism. In order for this symbolism to be 
internalized into the personal structure, the individual needs to achieve an affective 
organization of a high order by building up emotional attachments to other persons 
and developing the sensitivity to their attitudes through social interactions. Such an 
emotional organization is made possible only through acquisition of a cultural 
symbolism. 
 Thus, Parsons replaces Freud’s id-superego-ego structure with a more integrated 
one. Freud’s structure is based on the dichotomy of the external reality to which the 
person tries to adapt, first with the id being the source of incessant impulses and 
instincts, second with the ego having many defense mechanisms, and third with the 
superego being the moral and punitive regulator. There, the superego is viewed to 
internalize the moral values of society into the personality structure. Parsons, on 
the other hand, holds that all three components of culture (the cognitive, cathectic, 
and evaluative components) are internalized into the ego structure of the individual 
actor. Freud’s impulse-repression model with ego-functions having defense 
mechanisms is replaced by Parsons with a model of a socialized actor whose values 
and need-dispositions are a result of socialization under a system of cultural 
symbols in all three dimensions: cognition, cathexis, and evaluation. Once the 
individual actor becomes socialized to such an extent, the personal structure and 
the cultural environment cannot be separated from each other. The culture consists 
of (1) cognitive reference system, (2) expressive-affective symbolism, and (3) 
common moral standards. The symbolic elements of these are then internalized into 
the personality of the actor, whose ego has, internalized into it, (1) self-object 
images, (2) superego, and (3) symbolically organized affect. Between individual 
actors, there are then (1) mutual cognitive orientation and evaluative appraisal, 
based on internalized self-object images, and (2) mutual cathexis and evaluative 
appraisal, based on symbolically organized affect. With such internalization of 
culture, the individual actor’s motivations/need-dispositions become integrated 
with it. This is Parsons’ socialized conception of man and of the society-
personality relationship expounded in Parsons (1952). It is a conception of homo 
socius as institutionalized man, in which internalization of the symbolic elements 
of culture in the personality structure takes place on a scale wider than what was 
imagined by Freud. 
 Parsons’ theory of institutionalization explains why it is not legitimate to hold a 
dichotomous view that splits the motivational structure of an individual actor and 
the socio-cultural elements. Interacting actors have cognitive, cathectic, and 
evaluative orientations. Just as anything expressed verbally is mediated by a shared 
language (an expressive symbolism with its logic, which is socially acquired), an 
action in a social system is an expression in reference to: some cognitive system 
(which includes knowledge and reasoning we share), some shared expressive-
affective symbolism (which confers symbolic meanings), and a set of common 
moral and evaluative standards (along with positive sanctions for conformity and 
negative sanctions for deviation). For this reason, an action in a social system 
becomes interpretable in a socially meaningful way. Consumption as an act is no 
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exception. It is an act of expressing one’s need-disposition in reference to: (1) a 
shared expressive symbolism (which makes it possible to send a symbolic message 
to other spectators, therefore becomes the source of symbolic profits), (2) the 
cognitive knowledge we share about choice objects, and (3) common moral and 
evaluative standards (which legitimate and screen what we consume in the light of 
what is socially acceptable or valuable as a means of social status emulation along 
with symbolic profits it entails). Consumption, therefore, brings about a harmony 
between the dimensions of conformity-deviation and gratification-deprivation. 
Thus, in a broader picture of culture, a system of preferences of each individual 
consumer is a convoluted preference-value system, convoluted in the sense that it 
cannot be determined independently of the facts of the social space, valued in the 
sense that it absorbs the essential elements of culture in orienting itself.  
 Parsons’ theory of socialization and institutionalization provides an excellent 
framework in which to place the theories of Adam Smith, Veblen, and Bourdieu in 
perspective, in relation to one another. We now turn to the generative principles of 
these theories from the Parsonian perspective, that account for the way our 
society/economy produces its order as an institutionalized system. 
 
7. Adam Smith, Veblen, and Bourdieu in Relation to One 
Another from the Parsonian Perspective 
 Apart from many of the criticisms against the over-socialized view of man (e.g., 
Wrong, 1961), Parsons’ theory provides a useful theoretical framework by which 
to place human actions (including human behavior) in a social system in 
perspective. Parsons views an individual actor as an integrated structure of 
motivational and cultural elements, and a whole culture as comprised of three 
systems: belief systems, systems of expressive symbolism, and systems of 
evaluative standards, the last of which, constituting a system of values, is 
integrated into an action system and serves as selective criteria for screening 
actions. In a social system, cultural value patterns (common normative values) are 
internalized into the motivational structure of an individual actor along with 
positive sanctions for conformity thereto and negative sanctions for deviation there 
from. This internalization is mediated by value-attitudes or sentiments which 
become the need-dispositions of the personality. In this way, the ego-ideal (what 
one desires to accomplish) becomes integrated with the superego (the moral 
responsibilities), along with the sense of self-respect, adequacy, and security.  
Thus, for Parsons, this integration of common value patterns with the need-
dispositions of individuals through internalization is essential to social systems, 
and the stability of such systems depends crucially on the extent of this integration.   
 In Veblen’s theory, the instinct of workmanship, through succeeding phases of 
cultural evolution, constantly shapes and motivates our desire for invidious 
comparison, whether through an emulative demonstration of force in the primitive 
phase, or through acquisition by war and seizure in the predatory phase, or through 
accumulation of wealth in the quasi-peaceable phase. Out of these phases emerges 
the life of leisure as the most definitive evidence of pecuniary achievement and 
reputability, with exemption from productive work taking over accumulation of 
wealth as a measure of social standing. The leisure class brings with it refined 
codes of decorum on all walks of life and other vicarious means for the 
demonstration of the life of leisure. Conspicuous leisure and conspicuous 
consumption thus become social norms for members of the leisure class. The 
leisure class also brings with it a hierarchical differentiation of social classes, 
where lower classes emulate, as an ideal, the norms set by the leisure class at the 
top. The canon of conspicuous waste for invidious comparison traverses the 
aesthetic sense of what is useful and beautiful and cultivate our tastes for novelty 
by blending the beautiful and the honorific in the apperceptive activities of the 
mind. Such tastes tend to admire those goods that combine beauty, workmanship, 
and honorific reputability, thereby serving as a selective principle that screens 
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goods according to such combined effects. This selective principle is a derived 
principle from the instinct of workmanship (which is an acquired aptitude to prefer 
what is effective and avoid the futile) through habituation of our tastes. The derived 
desire for noble goods motivates producers to turn out innovative goods. The 
instinct of workmanship serves as a generative principle of such innovations 
through the virtues of production and innovation cultivated by people of the lower 
classes. Thus, the two principles are set in motion in tandem, one generative (of 
innovation) and the other selective (of consumption). These two principles interact 
in determining the course of cultural evolution. Veblen's theory is a theory that 
explains why and how the society bifurcates into the upper and lower classes which 
cultivate the virtues of consumption and innovation separately, yet complement 
each other through creation of an invidious culture that requires production of 
refined goods that are acquired by the class at the top to set a standard to be 
emulated by the lower classes. 
 Indeed, Veblen’s invidious culture has its own organization of (1) a cognitive 
reference system, (2) a system of expressive-affective symbolism, and (3) a system 
of moral standards. Expressive-affective symbolism permeates the entire society 
with signs of achievement and success as represented by consumption of the leisure 
class that adheres to refined codes of decorum. It has its way of cognizing and 
screening objects, in reference to the goal of upper status identification, as well as a 
system of moral standards pertaining to the institutions that protect the ownership 
of property and wealth as well as the rules of conduct that are consistent with 
virtues of production and consumption. The esthetic sense of nobility pervades the 
entire spectrum of human activities in this culture, and moral standards are no 
exception. There is a shared belief that the life of leisure is honorable, noble, and 
reputable, hence is something to be emulated, and that demonstration of success by 
emulating it (using right signs) is accepted as such by others. Emulation, therefore, 
collects a moral force of an ego-ideal. Thus, individual agents’ orientations (in 
believing and cognizing objects, in seeking what is pleasing, and in knowing how 
to evaluate objects as well as acts) are met by this culture. Veblen's invidious 
culture is indeed a system composed of systems of cognition and beliefs, 
expressive symbolism, and moral standards. 
 Order of society of such culture is sustained on two premises: (1) individuals 
are oriented toward the common normative standard of emulating consumption and 
codes of decorum of higher statuses, and (2) individuals’ motivation is integrated 
with this standard. Agents living under the culture acquire, socially, certain 
sentiments or value-attitudes that favor invidious comparison. Such sentiments 
constitute the need-dispositions of individual agents. That is, in an invidious 
culture, it is a need for individuals to acquire positive sentiments toward emulation. 
Thus, acting in conformity to such emulation is not only pleasing to the sentiments, 
but also optimizes the reactions of others since they share similar sentiments and a 
similar standard of emulation. Thus, the normative value of emulation is 
institutionalized in an invidious culture, and, as such, drives the social evolution.  
 Like Veblen's, Adam Smith’s theory has two complementary elements, man’s 
appreciation of workmanship in refined articles on the one hand and our moral 
sentiments of approbation and disapprobation, which dispose men to desire refined 
articles for the sake of getting applaud from the spectator, on the other. Such 
sentiments are habituated to admire the rich and despise the poor, and they 
constitute our desire to emulate the rich by acquiring those articles enjoyed by the 
wealthy. Because these sentiments are universal, superior stations of life set the 
standard of consumption to be emulated by men of lower stations of life. Custom 
and fashion of different ages and nations, by habituating the judgments of beauty 
(the apperceptive activity of beauty in Veblen), affect the moral sentiments of 
approbation and disapprobation, but their influences are limited to the propriety 
and impropriety of particular usages of such sentiments (particular passions and 
particular rules of decorum), never to their general character. Our moral character 
is compromised, but our moral sentiments never wane.  
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 In Parsons’ terms, the cultural (moral) values of emulating the rich and avoiding 
the poor are internalized into the motivational structure of the personality, and this 
internalized dispositions share the moral sentiments of approbation toward the rich 
and of disapprobation toward the poor as well as the moral ideal of seeking wealth. 
It may be said that the moral approbation-disapprobation dimension of an 
individual coincides with the favorable-unfavorable or the gratification-depravation 
dimension in Parsons’ language. For Adam Smith, this is all part of a deception 
that constantly renews the industry and ambition of mankind. A society with such 
moral sentiments has a conjoined force of innovation and emulation that mediates 
economic growth and expansion of employment through class differentiation and 
division of labor. In this sense, the theory of Adam Smith is a theory of reinforcing 
dynamics of (1) man’s ability to appreciate workmanship and (2) the moral 
sentiments of approbation and disapprobation, which turns the society into an 
invidious culture in which acquisition and demonstration of refined articles of the 
upper stations of life is believed to be applauded by the spectator. Again, individual 
agents’ orientations (how to cognize and what to believe, where to place emotional 
energy, and how to evaluate anything) are met by the cognitive-belief system, the 
evaluative system, and the moral standards that emerge spontaneously as a norm. 
These systems and standards are not the givens, but rather they emerge through 
cultural evolution. Of course, this is also true with Veblen. 
 Adam Smith’s concern is focused on how a socio-economic system becomes 
organized as an order that keeps expanding with all aspects of human existence 
integrated. Tastes and aesthetic sense of beauty, nobility, and propriety, 
dispositions, judgments, virtues of production and innovation, arts and sciences, 
man’s ambition and industry, organization of industry and employment, moral 
conducts, and any other aspect do not go their own way as disconnected things. 
They are different expressions or aspects of a grand harmonious order based on 
two principles; (1) moral sentiments for approbation, and (2) moral faculties. The 
latter is necessary to keep society from crumbling into nothing.  Observance of the 
general rules of morality is supported by the strongest motives of self-interest, 
which includes both self-regarding and other-regarding. In fact, one without the 
other is destructive of its foundation (MS, 241).  Thus, Adam Smith argues that our 
natural power of perception, our moral faculties, and our strongest motives of self-
interest will, through experience, be able to grasp moral rules by which to guide 
our conduct in whatever circumstances we find ourselves, and that these rules keep 
the human existence in harmony with the entire system. Individual agents, through 
their spontaneous activities and interaction, develop knowledge, learn to use good 
judgments in evaluating things, and form moral standards. What comes out of this 
interaction constitutes the essential components of society as a system. But, a grand 
order is a deception, not an objective order, created out of our own sentiments to be 
regarded well by others and the habituation of what we perceive as good and 
beautiful. Both Adam Smith and Veblen point to the dynamic evolution of a social 
system perpetuated by the generative principle, whether this principle is the 
workmanship or moral sentiments, and what comes to pass through this evolution 
is a product of the apperceptive activities of mankind mediated by habituation. 
 Bourdieu shares much with Adam Smith and Veblen. Bourdieu’s fundamental 
question focuses on how the social space is constructed actively in the mind of 
individuals, with all its differentiation captured from otherwise undifferentiated 
continuity and uniformity, and attempts to answer this question, not by an 
intellectual operation of a third person, but from within the space itself. Bourdieu’s 
notion of habitus is, therefore, the self-fulfilling or self-generating principle, and is 
defined both as a structuring structure and a structured structure. It is the necessity 
of one’s position in the social space turned into a systematic and transposable 
disposition that generates practices and perceptions that are socially meaningful. 
The social space is then filled with life-styles as socially qualified sign systems 
based on a distribution of symbolic capital and power, all in the mind of the 
constituent individuals. This habitus is then preserved by tastes, which are a 
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coherent set of preferences in the logic of sign systems, or, more generally, an 
operator of mapping from the space of neutral objects or physical bodies into the 
space of symbolic distinctions. It is such tastes that turn the necessity of one’s 
existence in the social space into the virtue of making choices. In a social space, 
economic and cultural capital are appropriated to different degrees in different 
classes. Such capital determines the distance and the proximity of life-styles, and 
the rich and the poor develop the tastes of luxury and necessity, respectively. 
Habitus, through such bifurcation based on economic and cultural capital, 
reproduces the social space from within, and structures the mind with the logic of 
socially meaningful symbolic distinctions and practices. In Parsons’ language, the 
habitus is the need-disposition which internalizes normative values or a logic of 
sign systems appropriate to a social class that one belongs, which is sustained by 
turning the economic necessity into the virtue of making appropriate choices. 
While Parsons identifies the institutionalization of common normative values as a 
necessary condition of a stable social system, Bourdieu identifies the habitus as the 
generative principle of this system, not as an objective operation but as a creative 
operation that turns the external into a durable disposition that constructs a 
meaningful social space from within. It is also a creative operation by which the 
institution of the economy becomes fully viable, although the way the economy 
works out its order is not brought to light fully in his theory. 
 In the language of Bourdieu’s theory, the expression of Veblen’s instinct of 
workmanship (his primary generative principle) as a positive principle of 
innovation and production and the habituated tastes for invidious comparison as a 
selective principle of consumption can be thought of as being both a structuring 
structure (that carries within it appropriate motivation and a system of symbolic 
signs) and a structured structure (with cultivated virtues and logic of practice and 
distinction). Likewise, Adam Smith’s notion of the dispositions guided by tastes 
for the reputability can be interpreted in a similar way. And, the symbolic space of 
those differentiated articles (of elegant contrivance and of ordinary usage) can be 
thought of as a structured structure that makes cultural consumption possible. 
Adam Smith’s human folly of toiling for more wealth and better contrivances 
resonates with Bourdieu’s notion that the experiences in the social world belong to 
a misrecognized order of this world, not an intellectual operation. The close 
affinities that run through Adam Smith, Veblen, and Bourdieu are not surprising as 
their views are based on the same concept of habitus meaning habit. 
 While Parsons’ view of human action in a social system emphasizes the 
integration of cultural value patterns and the motivational structure of individual 
actors, a society would lose its cohesiveness as an organization of differentiated 
roles and statuses unless the majority of its constituent personalities share certain 
common value attitudes or sentiments. Institutionalization of common normative 
values and internalization of such values into the motivational structure of 
individual agents does not imply an over-socialization of man as often criticized. 
Parsons says that the stability of any social system depends on the degree to which 
common normative values are integrated into the need-dispositions of its 
constituent personalities, and that the conceptual schemes of rational instrumental 
goal-orientation, common in economics, are not adequate for dynamic analysis of 
social systems and social processes. We think that Parsons’ dynamic theorem of 
sociology gives a useful conceptual scheme by which to analyze the evolutionary 
theories of Thorstein Veblen, Adam Smith, and Bourdieu, all of which address 
what is institutionalized and how this institutionalization influences the 
motivational structure of individual personalities. 
 Our review has made it sufficiently clear that all essential ingredients necessary 
for social actions and social systems that Parsons analyzed can be identified in the 
theories of Adam Smith, Veblen, and Bourdieu. These theories agree on these 
points: (1) Society as an order is not an objective reality, but rather a product of 
mind. (2) Man is disposed to like certain things and to act in certain ways because 
his dispositions reflect cultural values and norms as well as are inculcated by the 
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objective conditions of his existence (what is feasible, probable, impossible, or 
necessary). (3) Man’s behavior, as grounded in social space (which is a world 
created by the mind, not an objective reality) is expressive vis-à-vis a cultural 
symbolism (which is also the product of creation by the mind) as it seeks symbolic 
profits given economic and cultural capital. 
 Our inquiry into the institutionalized dispositions will not be complete until an 
entity we call 'social want' is defined and given a specific treatment. All of the 
theories that have been reviewed make it clear that social want is not something 
that can be taken for granted as if it were given a priori, precisely because it cannot 
be defined unless the agent is embedded in a particular culture endowed with a 
particular cultural symbolism. Furthermore, since social want is the sense of 
privation felt by the dispositions of the agent, it itself is a product of evolution, 
through which certain dispositions emerge along with cultural capital of life-styles 
distributed over a range of social classes that come into being. The sense of 
privation is felt only if the agent has a certain aspiration to overcome it, which 
should be part of his dispositions. Hence, the notion of social want requires two 
things: (1) certain social objects such as the life-styles of various classes that the 
agent cognizes and to which the agent himself is oriented, and (2) a socially 
acquired desire to seek upper status identification by emulating such life-styles. 
More specifically, social want must be defined as a convoluted want in that it takes 
both social facts (e.g., life-styles and their popularity across social classes) and 
shared normative values that are internalized into the motivational structure (e.g., 
the motive of emulation and avoidance for upper status identification under a 
cultural symbolism) for its orientation. Unless social want is convoluted in this 
sense, it would be difficult for any given society to generate its dynamism through 
innovation and industry. We now turn to the problem of how to define social want, 
with a hope to bridge the gap between economics and sociology, by introducing the 
notion of socio-economic rationality (i.e., the rationality of maximizing the 
symbolic profits of social status identification through emulation of higher status 
life-styles). 
 
8. Social Want and Socio-Economic Rationality 
Adam Smith, Veblen, Bourdieu, and Parsons agree to the point that many of 
human wants are socio-cultural in nature. They support the view that human wants 
(or individuals’ preferences or need-dispositions) are grounded in the 
institutionalized common normative values introjected into the motivational 
structure. If human wants are institutionalized (as wants created by the mind as it 
creates a social space), the idea of the utility function loses its power to explain 
human behavior if this behavior is rooted in such wants. The reason is clear: When 
it comes to the social utility of any good (the utility of a good to meet our social 
want), it is not possible to know a priori how useful it can be, unless one has 
learned, hence knows how meaningful it is to acquire it for the purpose of upper 
status identification in a particular culture in which the choice is made; that is, the 
social value of a good should consist in the symbolic profits it yields, or in cultural 
consumption that it affordsv. This means that at least four things are needed for 
evaluation of a good for its symbolic value: (1) a social space or field which 
features life-styles of various social classes (such styles are the clusters of 
complementary symbols), (2) a measure of distance that separates social classes on 
the social status ladder, (3) some sort of an effective emulation and avoidance 
pattern, not in the notional sense of the best response function derived from a given 
payoff function, but rather as a socially meaningful effective pattern that is a 
composite of economic, sociological, psychological, and communicational factors 
that constrain the emulative desire of an agent, and (4) a measure or an index of the 
popularity of goods across various life-styles, which informs the agent of the extent 
to which goods can yield symbolic profits (in terms of higher status identification) 
if emulated. If the social value of a choice object is based on all these things, 
preferences can no longer be independent of the social space/field in which 
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individuals are situated nor can it be independent of the motivational structure that 
reflects the normative values. In approaching the problem of choice decision 
making, economists usually start, with a good reason, with a utility function, 
whether this be defined on the space of choice objects or on the space of 
characteristics. In this conventional approach, the demand for any choice object 
reflects the nature of the objective constraints (that is, the budget constraint and a 
production function that mediates choice objects and characteristics). In contrast, 
the institutional theories of Adam Smith, Veblen, Bourdieu, and Parsons suggest 
that the utility of a good arises more from an individual's appreciation of its 
symbolic value in relation to the social space perceived in his mind as well as in 
relation to the socially acquired dispositions, than from its objective characteristics. 
But, such appreciation of symbolic values requires that our tastes and thought be 
habituated in certain ways. Cultural consumption is a virtue in itself as Bourdieu 
argues, in that it reflects the objective conditions of existence, and social want is 
born from a sense of privation in this consumption. This is why we believe that an 
effective emulation pattern over the life-styles of various social classes or groups 
(not the notional reaction function) is critically important in defining social want. 
This is consistent with Bourdieu's idea of the effective demand of the habitus, 
which reflects all constraining objective conditions of existence.  
 Because of this relationship between symbolic values of goods and habituated 
tastes, it is important to relate man’s symbolic-expressive behavior to the 
economics of bounded rationality á la Simon (1955, 1959) and to the economics of 
limited cognition (e.g., Cyert & March, 1963; Conlisk, 1988; Day & Pingle, 1991; 
Pingle, 1992; Pingle & Day, 1996). If cultural capital is a stock of life-styles that 
have evolved from the conditions of existence and is a collection of complementary 
clusters of symbols (each life-style is a cluster of symbols), it can serve as a 
powerful guide in directing the agent’s choices by allowing him to focus on what is 
useful for symbolic profits and by letting him save cognition itself. That is, if a 
social space is a space in which life-styles appear as concentrated clusters of 
various cultural symbols and if the agent seeks symbolic profits, the most effective 
choices can be made by making direct use of them. From the standpoint of the 
economics of bounded rationality, we may name solutions offered by life-styles 
‘heuristic solutions’ because of the economization they afford. But, it is more than 
that. As Bourdieu elaborated, the conditions of existence (the possibilities, 
probabilities, impossibilities, freedom, restraints, and what not) create virtues of 
consumption by way of forming life-styles. The capital of life-styles itself is a 
product of the restraining external conditions. Thus, it is not that the agent relies on 
life-styles because the external conditions of existence limits our rationality, but 
rather that the agent makes use of them actively because they are the virtuous ways 
of consuming created from the external conditions.   
 At any rate, it is useful to take note of the following observations on the logic of 
bounded rationality: (1) The decision-making environment including the internal 
psychology and the cognitive capacity of a decision maker has its limits; the 
internal psychology has its own way of perceiving things, and the cognitive 
capacity is not unlimited; (2) the time endowment is fixed, so that all activities 
including thinking, cognition, and evaluation compete for the use of time; (3) 
information on which decisions are based is not only insufficient but often 
erroneous, but information gathering/processing to correct the situation requires a 
significant amount of time; (4) many situations in which decisions are made are not 
only risky but also uncertain beyond any objective probability (because the 
situations are novel), which requires that decisions be made on subjective 
probabilities. (5) Even if these conditions were not present, decision making in a 
social environment faces a serious problem of coping with uncertain responses 
from other agents. Under these limitations, decision makers may turn to solutions 
that are not only reliable but also economizing on the cost of decision making. If 
there are simple modes of behavior which have proved to be effective over the 
years through an error-learning process, there is a good reason to tap on such 
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modes. This is, in essence, the point made by Simon (1978) when he brought forth 
the notion of bounded rationality exercised through the procedural rationality as 
opposed to the substantive rationality which requires substantial amount of 
resources. 
 In the case of choices made for symbolic profits, the agent cannot turn away 
from the social and cultural norms of society because it is precisely these norms 
that define symbolic values of choice objects. Hence, to the extent that human 
behavior is grounded in a social space and is, therefore, a symbolic-expressive 
behavior, it is necessary for the agent to turn to such norms for guidance on 
symbolic profit making.  At the same time, the norms, particularly, in the form of 
life-styles, have emerged from the conditions of existence over time through trial 
and error, hence can serve as the source of heuristic solutions to otherwise complex 
problems. For expressive behavior in a social space, it is not only expedient but 
also necessary to rely on the knowledge accumulated in the life-styles, for turning 
away from them defeats the whole purpose of expressive behavior aimed at 
symbolic profits. Hodgson (1986) argues that in understanding human behavior it 
is not necessary to fall into the trap of complete voluntaristic individualism (typical 
in economics) nor into the trap of the structural determinism (as often found in 
sociology), by coming to terms with norm-oriented purpose behavior. Bounded 
rationality that draws on social capital of heuristics offered by life-styles allows 
human behavior to be molded by social and cultural norms while retaining the 
autonomy of individual decision makers. Relying on this capital not only facilitates 
our decision making but also meets an important criterion of how to express one’s 
choice as a symbolically meaningful choice. Thus, symbolic expressive behavior 
and orientation to social and cultural norms converge on the motive of bounded 
rationality. 
 Economization is a strong motive, for all of our resources including time and 
the capacity of cognition are limited. Hence, how to economize decision making is 
a matter of serious concern to all decision makers. Day (1984, 1987) listed seven 
basic modes of economizing choices: (1) obedience to an authority, (2) imitation of 
others' modes, (3) habit (unconscious repetition of past behavior), (4) unmotivated 
search, (5) hunch, (6) experimentation (trial and error), and (7) procedural 
optimizing (see also Pingle & Day, 1996). Some of these modes (particularly, (2), 
(3), and (7)) may draw on social and cultural norms, not only as a source of low-
cost heuristics but also as a source of socially acceptable ways by which to seek 
symbolic profits in an invidious environment. In fact, it is impossible to seek such 
profits without knowing where the norms lie. Beckert (1996), on the other hand, 
argued that if the means-end relations on which economic calculations are based 
are lacking because of uncertainty, some external mechanisms are needed to reduce 
the choice set of decision makers and to restore certainty in the means-end 
relations. As Knight (1921) argued, uncertainty is not something that can be 
reduced to calculable probabilities. This implies that the means-end relations may 
break down under uncertainty. That is, choosing means does not lead to an end 
even in probability terms. If such relations break down, the power of the 
conventional rational choice theory falls with it. Hence, the condition of 
uncertainty necessitates that this theory be replaced by a more practical way of 
handling it that can somehow restore the means-end relations by narrowing the set 
of choice objects. As an alternative to the objective rationality, Beckert introduced 
the notion of intentional rationality as the kind of rationality that relies on simple 
devices as instruments of uncertainty reduction. Such devices include (1) tradition, 
habit, and routines, (2) norms and institutions, (3) structural pre-dispositions of 
decisions such as social networks, organizational structures, and past decisions, and 
(4) power relations (Beckert, 1996, pp. 827-829). Making use of these devices 
narrows the choice set of decision makers and make actions adaptive and hence 
predictable, by building up rigidities in human behavior. But, if this is the case, 
these devices beg a difficult question to answer: Why do they serve as devices of 
uncertainty reduction to begin with? In order for this to be true, the devices 
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themselves must bear some sort of collective wisdom so that the decision makers 
feel good about the choices they suggest. In this paper, we answer this question by 
showing why norm-oriented emulative behavior under a cultural symbolism 
simplifies the decision making, yet produces a cultural expressive behavior that 
serves the purpose of emulating higher statuses. 
 At any rate, Beckert’s argument is consistent with Bourdieu’s idea of habitus, 
which turns the external conditions of probabilities, possibilities, and 
impossibilities into virtues of making choices showing up as life-styles, as well as 
with the theories of Adam Smith and Veblen, which show how our tastes are 
circumvented and turn into the sense of nobility that can serve as the principle of 
surveillance. As those objects that do not appeal to the sense of nobility or do not 
fit life-styles are screened out, the choice set is certainly narrowed by this 
surveillance. The notion of intentional rationality also implies that the narrowing of 
the choice set must be intentional. We are not interested in those objects that 
merely serve as instruments of uncertainty reduction. We are interested in those 
instruments that serve our intention. Again, Adam Smith, Veblen, and Bourdieu 
come to support this argument, for they all argue that our consumption is a virtuous 
activity vis–à–vis a cultural symbolism that we are familiar with. Particularly 
important is the cultural capital of life-styles as clusters of symbolic values, which 
the agent intends to emulate or avoid. We can assume that Beckert's devices, (1) 
tradition, habit, and routines, and (2) norms and institutions, are all present in this 
capital, which serves not only as the device of uncertainty reduction but also as the 
device of facilitating symbolic profit making. 
 We also note that Beckert’s argument that the devices of uncertainty reduction 
narrows the choice set, thereby making actions more rigid and predictable shares 
much with Heiner’s insight (1983, 1989) that being bounded in decision making is 
an important source of predictable behavior, for decision makers turn to more 
inflexible decision rules. But, again, his insight begs another question: If agents 
turn to more inflexible rules, how do such rules come about? Are they part of the 
collective wisdom that has absorbed the cost of decision making under bounded 
rationality, and why this wisdom is focused more narrowly on the range of possible 
choices? All of the arguments made on simplification devices (i.e., economization 
of economizing) requires a higher principle that in fact renders the devices 
effective with respect to something in which agents are interested. 
 In a similar vein, Simon (1976) argued that the intended and bounded rationality 
(that takes the form of satisficing behavior) forms the theoretical basis of 
administrative behavior. We recall here that Hayek (1967) made a similar point 
that while our conscious activities are subject to supra-conscious rules (which are 
intuited but whose content cannot be made clear), we resort to such rules as 
customs, habits, and moral rules in order to narrow the range of choice alternatives 
so that our actions are made more meaningful, which is the crux of the matter 
because any rule that makes our actions less meaningful would not be adopted (see 
aldo Hayek, 1973; 1988). In this regard, it is also worth mentioning that in the 
double contingency problem that Parsons (1954) addressed, ego and alter may 
resolve this problem by narrowing the range of their actions to those that are 
socially meaningful with symbols that can be interpreted easily. This is similar in 
spirit to what Gintis (2009) refers to as the choreographing of actions or strategies 
based on common beliefs and social norms. Certainly, the reliance on cultural 
capital of life-styles not only narrows the range of choice alternatives but also 
makes choices meaningful in symbolic terms. It cannot be a coincidence that the 
theories of cultural evolution by Adam Smith, Veblen, and Bourdieu all relied on 
habituation as the most important principle that turns the world of non-
differentiated continuities into the world of symbols, where the agent's choice 
becomes focused on symbolic values rather than values of natural origin. A social 
space is distinctly different from a physical space in this regard. But, symbolic 
values or signs do not exist isolated from one another but exist as clusters that 
define life-styles as virtues of consumption, which makes emulation a socially 
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desirable thing to do. Such life-styles narrow the range of choices and allows the 
agent, at the same time, to concentrate his industry on accumulation of wealth. The 
logic of bounded rationality and the tools we use to resolve it were pursued in 
various insightful forms in the 84th Dahlem Workshop on Bounded Rationality: 
The Adaptive Toolbox, Berlin, 1999 (e.g., Gigerenzer & Selton, 2001; Selton, 
2001; Gigerenzer, 2001; Boyd & Richerson, 2001; Goldstein, Rappporteur, 2001). 
 The recognition that human behavior is bounded-rational and that such 
rationality calls for devices that reduce the complexity of problem solving do 
support the institutional approaches of Veblen, Adam Smith, Bourdieu, and 
Parsons, or vice versa.  We believe the following points are particularly important 
in constructing a model of norm-guided behavior (or norm-guided endogenous 
preference formation): (1) The society, as a system, takes on a bigger meaning than 
a mere aggregation of its parts, since it holds itself as an order by a principle of 
internal connection and integration that is higher than a principle that applies to its 
parts. (2) What the society has accumulated as social and cultural capital over years 
can serve as reliable sources of socially meaningful (i.e., symbolically meaningful) 
simplification devices to otherwise complex decision problems. (3) Decision 
makers will turn to simple modes of behavior or heuristic solutions in order to 
economize on cognitive effort otherwise required to deal with the strenuous 
decision-making environment. (4) If preferences are composed of various needs 
that are not necessarily commensurate, these needs may have to be prioritized and 
satisfied sequentially with switching from one need to the next being effectuated as 
soon as the aspiration level is reached. (5) There are social and cultural norms 
(social institutions, customs, sanctions, cultural values, etc.), which would not be 
reproduced and sustained unless such norms motivate individuals to endow their 
actions with social meaning supportive of the norms. If the needs beyond physical 
ones are social needs that arise from social and cultural norms, such norms may 
account for the origin of norm-guided preferences under social interdependence. 
(6) More strongly, the formation of norm-guided preferences or the recognition of 
social needs reflects the desire to act in a socially meaningful way when there are 
serious limits to the objective rationality. Social and cultural norms are, therefore, 
not simply the sources of external influences on human behavior, but rather they 
endow the decision-making environment with a social and cultural structure in 
which norm-oriented preferences are actively formed to reproduce the structure 
itself. (7) Under a socially and culturally structured environment, individuals are 
likely to exercise local rationality within their zones of flexible responses in Day’s 
terms (1984, 1986), which are determined by the history of their past emulation 
and avoidance and accumulation of economic and cultural capital. In Kahneman 
and Tversky’s terms (1979), these zones, therefore, come with certain endowments 
reflecting the history of the decisions made, and provide the reference point in the 
process of emulation. 
 Based on these considerations, it is possible to construct a theory of choice 
behavior that answers Simon’s call for procedural rationality as well as Hodgson's 
call for norm-oriented purposive behavior, by positing that low-cost heuristics to 
otherwise complex problems can be found in the life-styles of social groups. These 
life styles constitute the social capital that has been accumulated through collective 
learning processes. The idea is that if the cost of problem solving is too excessive 
for single individuals to bear, it makes sense to invest in this capital collectively by 
sharing the cost of the required investment, because the benefits of the accumulated 
consumption know-how accrue to all members of social groups. If one relies on 
this capital in making choice of consumption goods or durable goods, the task of 
selecting the best object from the set of feasible alternatives is reduced to the act of 
referring to what has been tested and proved effective collectively. The life styles 
of social groups are embedded in a cultural-value system so that the act of orienting 
to them will be in accord with the need-dispositions that have internalized common 
normative values.  This implies then that individuals in a social system are aware 
of appropriate choices to make as well as appropriate actions to take for the sake of 
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upper status identification, with good understanding of what constitutes social 
sanctions that help define the socially acceptable parameters of the zones of 
flexible responses (Granovetter, 1985). In this sense, the society (as a social space) 
is not simply a collection of life-styles or clusters of wants or symbolic values, but 
is a culturally directed social field (analogous to a magnetic field in physics) in 
which the life styles of social groups exist as collectively-tested norms of 
consumption and in which individuals are informed of the effective direction for 
higher status identification when acting within such zones. It is such social field 
that gives rise to social want as a culturally directed social predisposition. 
 More specifically, building a theory of choice based on this social want requires 
a measurement of the degree to which this want is gratified by choice objects, so 
that this indexation can be used to form some sort of ranking on such objects. We 
may call this measurement the symbolic valuation. Since there is no a priori utility 
function, such measurement must be constructed from the social field. Suppose that 
this field has many social groups whose social statuses can be ranked along the 
social status ladder. Then, we may think of the life-styles of various social groups 
as being located on this ladder. One’s current social status provides a reference 
point with respect to which the distance to other statuses can be defined, by 
subtracting the ranks of the latter from that of the former. With this convention, the 
social distance to a higher status takes a positive value whereas that to a lower 
status takes a negative value. If we could define an emulation-avoidance pattern on 
this social distance space, by taking into account all relevant forces that work on 
choice making, e.g., the economic principle that defines how costly it is to make 
any choice, the sociological principle that governs the presence of social norms and 
sanctions, the psychological principle that dictates how choice objects are 
perceived in the mind of individuals in terms of satisfaction, and the 
communicational principle that works on the flow of information between social 
classes, i.e., on how information is disseminated within and across social groups 
(see Ray,1973), then it would be possible to approximate the degree to which any 
given commodity can meet the social want by taking the convolution of this 
emulation-avoidance pattern with the objective date on the distribution of the 
commodity's popularity index over the life-styles of the social groups. The most 
distinct feature of such measurement is that it is grounded in an actual social field 
in which social distance and the direction of social status emulation are defined. 
We may call such measurement the social want satisfying property of a 
commodity. If the social actors base their choice decisions on this convoluted 
measurement, it becomes an important source of social evolution driven by the 
motives for emulation and avoidance. This is very much in accord with what Adam 
Smith and Veblen expounded in their evolutionary theories. What distinguishes our 
notion of convoluted social want from any other treatment of human wants is that 
the social want here is captured as a joint product of institutionalized 
preferences/dispositions on the one hand and social capital of life-styles as 
accumulated knowhow of consumption on the other, which directs our motives for 
symbolic profit making. There is no such thing as social want that can be treated in 
the abstract because it is always paired with an actual existing society that has its 
own cultural and expressive symbolism.   
 It should be reminded that the emulation-avoidance pattern that is based on the 
afore-mentioned principles is an effective pattern, effective in the sense analogous 
to the distinction between the Keynesian effective demand (which would arise if 
prices and wages were more or less rigid, hence if employment level and demand 
for goods are mutually constrained) and the Walrasian notional demand (which 
would emerge only under full adjustment of prices and wages). Just as the real 
purchasing power determines the former demand, in a similar vein, the effective 
emulation-avoidance pattern represents the real power to emulate or avoid with all 
its determinants taken into account: economic, psychological, social, and 
informational. Moreover, such patterns may give a certain dynamic structure to the 
emulation and avoidance game played by the constituent members of society with 
Journal of Economic and Social Thought 
                                     JEST, 4(1), H. Hayakawa. p.1-40. 
31 
invidious culture, possibly giving rise to strategic complementarities between 
emulative efforts taken by the members and, therefore, to multiple equilibria of 
such actions (Cooper & John, 1988). This is analogous to the fact that when prices 
were rigid, there could be strategic complementarities among the production levels 





 We now study the implications of this effective emulation-avoidance pattern by 
showing a few examples. Fig. 1 shows two emulation-avoidance patterns, 1 and 2.  
They are defined on the social distance dimension shown by the horizontal axis. 
Pattern 1 has a shape typical of individuals whose dispositions are leaning toward 
invidious comparison as in Veblen’s theory of the leisure class or in Adam Smith’s 
theory of moral sentiments. It is skewed toward higher statuses with avoidance on 
far ends. The negative values of the pattern on far ends are caused partly by social 
sanctions against excessive deviation, partly by the diminished flow of information 
from distant social classes, and partly by the risk of losing the complementarity of 
goods consumed. On the other hand, pattern 2 has a shape typical of individuals 
whose dispositions are more inclined toward the life-styles that are being lived 
now, again with avoidance on far ends; it captures roughly what Bourdieu has in 
mind when he says that the objective external conditions of existence are turned 
into virtues of liking what one has or is familiar with. If the psychological 
satisfaction from higher statuses is large and does not diminish much (according to 
the law of diminishing satisfaction), the shape of the emulation-avoidance pattern 
will be more skewed to the right. This is also true with less sanctions against 
deviation, which will be the case if an invidious culture strongly encourages 
emulation. 
 The emulation-avoidance patterns of different individuals are individual-
specific depending on their current social statuses (their reference points) and the 
endowments of their cultural capital, but they are homologous in structure, within 
or across social classes. This is consistent with Bourdieu's idea that the habitus 
dispositions of different individuals belonging to a social class are variations of the 
same homologous structure. This homology extends to all different classes 
basically because the logic of the habitus remains similar but also because the four 
principles determining the pattern should work in all classes, even at the top 
although there are no higher classes. As Adam Smith and Veblen stress, the social 
class at the top always tries to distance itself from the lower classes to avoid their 
emulation by setting a new fashion. The class at the top, therefore, has an 
emulation and avoidance pattern with the social statuses in the positive direction 




the emulaltion-avoidance patter 1
skewed toward higher statuses
the emulaltion-avoidance pattern 2
clustered around one’s current status
one’s current status
Figure 1
The emulation-avoidance pattern as 
an effective pattern
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 Apart from the emulation and avoidance pattern is a distribution of the 
popularity index of any given good in the life-styles of various social groups. An 
example will clarify the point. Suppose that the popularity of a durable good A is 
indexed and has a distribution shown by one on the right in Fig. 2. It shows how 
popular the good is across different social statuses. This is an objective social fact. 
The good is unpopular in the far ends, and its popularity peaks around the s**-
status. There is another distribution shown by one on the left in the same figure, 
which represents the popularity of another good B across social statuses, which 
shows its peak around the s*-status.  One can think of these distributions in the 
same way as the probability distributions as the total popularity across all social 




 Now, let an emulation-avoidance pattern in Figure 1 be represented, for an 
agent i, by𝑓𝑖(𝑠 − 𝑇𝑖)  where𝑇𝑖  represents the agent’s current social status (his 
reference point), and let a popularity distribution of good A𝑔(𝑠). If we take a 
convolution of these two functions, we obtain a new measure given by:  
 
𝐴 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 =  𝑓𝑖
𝐷
 𝑠 − 𝑇𝑖 𝑔 𝑠 𝑑𝑠 
   
where the integral is taken over the domain D of the social status s. This 
measurement shows the capacity of good A to meet the agent's social want of upper 
status identification at his current status T. We may, therefore, define this capacity 
as: 
 
𝑊𝑖 𝑇𝑖 : 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝐴 =  𝑓
𝐷
 𝑠 − 𝑇𝑖 𝑔 𝑠 𝑑𝑠 
  
where 𝑊𝑖(𝑇𝑖 : 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝐴) is the social want satisfying capacity of good A for agent i 
whose status is 𝑇𝑖 .  Note that if the popularity distribution 𝑔(𝑠) is interpreted as a 
probability distribution and if 𝑓𝑖 𝑠 − 𝑇𝑖  is interpreted as a random variable, this 
capacity is analogous to the expected value of the emulation-avoidance pattern 
𝑓𝑖 𝑠 − 𝑇𝑖 . That is, the social want satisfying capacity can be interpreted as this 
expected value.  Also note that if the emulation-avoidance pattern remains similar, 
𝑓𝑖 𝑠 − 𝑇𝑖  can be obtained by shifting 𝑓𝑖 𝑠  to the right by the agent's status 𝑇𝑖 . 
 If we take another agent whose social status is different from T, then with a 
homologous emulation and avoidance pattern, the social want satisfying capacity 
of the same good A for this agent will be different, greater or less depending on 
where his status lies relative to the distribution function 𝑔(𝑠). Hence, for two 




The distribution of the popularity of a good
Journal of Economic and Social Thought 
                                     JEST, 4(1), H. Hayakawa. p.1-40. 
33 
avoidance patterns are given by 𝑓𝑖 𝑠 − 𝑇𝑖  and 𝑓𝑗  𝑠 − 𝑇𝑗   which are homologous in 
shape, we will expect that 
𝑊𝑖 𝑇𝑖 : 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝐴 =  𝑓𝑖
𝐷
 𝑠 − 𝑇𝑖 𝑔 𝑠 𝑑𝑠 
≠ 𝑊 𝑇𝑗 : 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝐴 =  𝑓𝑗
𝐷
 𝑠 − 𝑇𝑗  𝑔 𝑠 𝑑𝑠 
 
Thus, the same good has different social want satisfying capacities for different 
agents of different statuses even if its distribution function remains unchanged. The 
symbolic value of a good is, therefore, different between different agents. 
 This is the reason why this capacity cannot be measured by a utility function 
given a priori even if this function is indexed by the social status of the agent. The 
measurement of the capacity requires a posteriori information as to the distribution 
of the popularity across the social status ladder. This is consistent with Bourdieu’s 
point that for the habitus dispositions, it is not possible to dichotomize dispositions 
and the external conditions of the existence, and with Parsons’ view that the 
scheme of instrumental goal-orientation is not adequate for actions motivated by 
institutionalized dispositions that internalize common normative values. Any 
scheme of instrumental goal-orientation would require an a priori given objective 
function independent of the means to achieve it, which is impossible to meet for 
symbolic expressive behavior based on dispositions. 
To the extent that the emulation-avoidance pattern reflects all relevant 
principles discussed above (the factors that determine its effective shape), the 
measured capacity can be thought of the effective social or cultural capital 
(expressive-symbolic capital) contained in a good or in a bundle of goods in 
question. Since the measurement takes a numerical value, it defines a binary 
relation on any pair of choice objects, single goods or composites of goods. Thus, 
with this relation defined on the space of choice objects, we are in a position to 
analyze its properties such as reflexivity, transitivity, and completeness. Since 
these properties are met, the binary relation constitutes a preference order. This fact 
allows us to characterize the agent’s choice based on social want satisfaction in 
rational terms; that is, the agent’s choice from any budget set can now be 
rationalized as being the most preferred bundle in this set (see Richter 1971 on 
rationalizability). Here, the phrase, ‚the most preferred‛, refers to the highest in the 
social want satisfying capacity (see Hayakawa, 2000). The difference from the 
conventional theory of choice, which is based on the premise that a preference 
relation or a utility function is an a priori given mapping, is clear.  
 Denoting the social want satisfying capacity by SWSC, we may formally write 
this optimization problem, as a first approximation, as follows: 
 







𝑥𝑖 ≤ 𝑀 
   
Where M is the agent’s income or wealth; 𝑥𝑖  is the quantity of the i-th good; 𝑝𝑖  is 
the price of this good; 𝑓(𝑠 − 𝑇) is an emulation and avoidance patter; 𝑔(𝑠, 𝑥𝑖) is a 
popularity distribution of 𝑥𝑖  (its quantity is allowed to vary to take into account the 
fact that a small amount of 𝑥𝑖  may be popular while a large amount is not); ∏ is a 
product notation.  The reason why SWSC is expressed as a product of the n 
convolutions is because emulation is targeted at a life-style, which requires that 
certain goods be consumed in a complementary manner. The idea is that a 
commodity bundle x may have a higher social want satisfying capacity if it is 
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consistent with a life-style to be emulated. Formalizing the expressive behavior in 
this manner shows that it produces a consistent and rationalizable behavior. Since 
such behavior is based on the symbolic meaning of choices made in terms of upper 
status identification, we call its governing principle the socio-economic rationality 
as opposed to pure economic rationality.    
 Thus, measuring the social want satisfying capacity of any choice object by 
taking a convolution of an emulation-avoidance pattern with a distribution pattern 
of its popularity across social statuses, and postulating the agent's behavioral 
principle as the optimization on this capacity under a given budget set grounds the 
agent’s choice in an actual social space in which he emulates the life-styles of 
higher statuses. Note again that it has to be a convolution of two functions, one 
defining an effective emulation and avoidance pattern anchored in one’s current 
social status and the other giving a distribution of the popularity of any given good, 
single or composite. The latter is an objective social fact, hence stays the same for 
all constituent members of the society. The former differs from one individual to 
another although the same set of principles or factors determine its homologous 
structure. Since the life-styles are the consumption norms associated with social 
classes, and also since the desire to emulate higher statuses is a cultural value norm 
(in an invidious culture), optimization on the social want satisfying capacity 
defines an effective norm-guided behavior that works proficiently for symbolic 
profit seeking.  
 Many of human wants or needs are physiological, but humans have cultivated 
many socially acceptable and symbolically meaningful ways of satisfying them. It 
is this fact that makes the symbolic profit seeking behavior particularly important. 
That is, when there are many objects that can satisfy wants and needs to various 
degrees, the social want satisfying capacity contained in them will be a final judge 
of which object to choose. This fact can be formalized by considering a satisficing 
lexicographic preference ordering defined on the space of all wants/needs, 
physiological or social, which are prioritized, with each want having a satisficing 
level so that the agent’s attention switches from one want to another when this 
level is reached. The last one must be the social want because this want is the final 
judge in cultural consumption. Since an ordering is reflexive, complete, and 
transitive, it will make the expressive behavior consistent, hence characterizable as 
a rational behavor (Hayakawa 2000). But, the ordering itself is not measurable, that 
is, it cannot be represented by a utility function (Georgescu-Roegen 1954, Fishburn 
1974). Parsons characterized human dispositions as need-dispositions, and needs 
can be prioritized, which makes it plausible to think that the agent attends to them 
by setting certain satisficing levels. 
 It is interesting that Day’s notion of the zone of flexible responses, the zone in 
which an individual makes his or her flexible decisions in a recursive system, 
shares much in common with a socio-economically determined zone discussed 
here, in which an individual tries to make the most meaningful choices for upper 
status identification by convoluting the effective emulation-avoidance pattern with 
the social facts of the popularity distribution of choice objects across social 
statuses. We can think of this zone as being determined by one’s current social 
position (including his income, wealth, and cultural capital) like in the case of 
Bourdieu's habitus. More specifically, each agent, occupying a certain position in a 
social space, seeks upper status identification by trying to move from one zone to 
another in a direction that is most effective. 
 As Adam Smith and Veblen argued, seeking higher statuses or the image of 
such statuses by emulating their life-styles is an essential part of an invidious 
culture. But, such seeking is based not on utility functions (or the payoff functions) 
given a priori but on a socio-culturally inculcated desire for upper status 
identification under an effective emulation and avoidance pattern determined by 
the conditions of social sanctions, information flow, psychological satisfaction, and 
feasible economic means. As we discussed above, it is possible to characterize 
what the agent seeks as homo socius, which we defined as the symbolic profits 
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represented by the want satisfying capacity contained in choice objects. That is, the 
agent's expressive behavior based on institutionalized dispositions (or need 
dispositions) can be formalized as the rational behavior in terms of symbolic profit 
seeking subject to the feasibility of economic means. This allows us to state, as a 
general proposition, that the agent of institutionalized dispositions is rational in his 
or her expressive behavior as much as the same agent would be equally rational in 
economic profit seeking. But what makes cultural expressive behavior so attractive 
and commanding is that, by attending to norms of life-styles, it is not only 
consistent and rationalizable but also predictable and interpretable in symbolic 
terms, hence serves as an effective medium of cultural evolution by facilitating 
symbolic communication.  
 
9. Concluding Remarks 
 Our discussion on social norm-guided choice behavior and emulation-avoidance 
patterns suggests that it is possible to articulate the institutional nature of choice 
decision making of agents as well as how this nature mediates the evolution of a 
socio-economic order (which draws on the formation of the common normative 
values and the introjection of such values into the motivational structure of each 
person). Such articulation goes with Hodgson’s (2004) recapitulation of the 
reconstitutive effects of institutions on the formation of individual preferences as 
the key to the mechanism of institutionalization. It goes equally well with his 
recapitulation of the degree to which institutional evolution may depend on habit 
formation, which occupies the central place in the theories of Adam Smith, Veblen, 
and Bourdieu. Also, our view is very supportive of Gintis’ view (2009) that 
humans have a normative predisposition to let common beliefs and social norms to 
choreograph a correlated equilibrium, which points to a new direction in 
understanding how the bounds of reason and forms of sociality are integrated by a 
higher principle that can potentially harmonize conflicting interests of social actors. 
Such a view is an outgrowth of Parsons’ institutionalization theory which 
addressed, on a grand scale, the double contingency problem that needs to be 
resolved in one way or another to avoid the Hobbesian disorder. Parsons’ theory 
says that social systems are constituted of the need-dispositions that individual 
actors acquire by internalizing common normative values into their motivational 
structures. This theory can still provide a powerful framework of analysis that can 
highlight the importance of integrating social ontology of downward causation 
(from the emerging properties of social norms to decisions and interactions of 
micro units) with economic ontology of upward causation (from actions and 
interactions of micro units to the emergence of social norms) as well as the 
importance of integrating cultural symbolism and norm-orientation with the 
voluntarism of agents (Alexander 1983; Alexander & Giesen 1987). As argued in 
this paper, we can go beyond Parsons’ division between economics (whose 
methodology consists in instrumental rationality) and sociology (whose 
methodology consists in analysis of institutionalized dispositions and behavior), by 
showing that choice behavior based on such dispositions can still be articulated as a 
rational behavior that seeks symbolic profits. In fact, as the theories of Adam 
Smith, Veblen, Bourdieu, and Parsons indicate, institutionalization of tastes, which 
is a product of evolution, is fundamental to any society. If so, human behavior 
based on institutionalized dispositions must transcend the dichotomy between 
objectives and means. Yet, it produces a predictable and rationalizable behavior 
that should contribute to the formation of a stable socio-economic order. 
 Rather than assuming that agents have perfect information required for his 
decision making or for strategic calculation, we should stay within the site in which 
agents’ dispositions are formed to reflect the structural features of society, and ask 
a more relevant question as to whether it is possible to characterize agents’ 
behavior in this site as rationalizable expressive behavior aiming at symbolic 
profits of one kind or another. We have demonstrated that it is possible to do so, 
although it is not the only way, by defining such profits as the social want 
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satisfying capacity contained in choice objects with due regard to what it means to 
maximize this capacity in terms of emulation and avoidance of life-styles across 
social statuses with economically feasible means. The expressive behavior 
characterized as such is the source of consistent predictive behavior that reinforces 
common normative values, and which, for this very reason, serves as an effective 
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iSimon (1978), referring to the concept of the rational man in economics as a perfect utility maximizer 
and writing on the trade between economics and other sister social sciences had this to say: 
It is this concept of rationality that is economics’ main export commodity in its trade with the other 
social sciences.  It is no novelty in those sciences to propose that people behave rationally – if that 
term is taken in its broader dictionary sense. Assumptions of rationality are essential components of 
virtually all the sociological, psychological, political, and anthropological theories with which I am 
familiar. What economics has to export, then, is not rationality, but a very particular and special 
form of it – the rationality of the utility maximizer, and a pretty smart one at that.  But international 
flows have to be balanced. If the program of this meeting aims at more active intercourse between 
economics and her sister social sciences, then we must ask not only what economics will export, but 
also what she will receive in payment.  An economist might well be tempted to murmur the lines of 
the tentmaker: ‚I wonder often what the Vintners buy – Only half as precious as the stuff they sell.‛ 
Simon (1978, p. 2) 
ii The field of behavioral economics and psychological economics has cultivated new approaches to 
explaining human behavior that are more consistent with the way human mind and psyche actually 
work to affect human behavior. We are now familiar with such notions as prospect, reference 
dependent preferences, endowments effects, and hyper-discounting, which have contributed a great 
deal in explaining human behavior that is not easily reconcilable with the traditional economic 
theory. These notions cannot be ignored in cultural-symbolic expressive behavior, for which risk-
taking of emulation and the valuation of choice objects for their symbolic serviceability depend on 
economic and cultural endowments as well as on where the agent is located in a social space and the 
degree of uncertainty which tends to create a strong bias toward the current social status and life-
style. See, e.g., Kahneman & Tversky (1979), Kahneman & Knetsch, & Thaler (1990, 1991), 
Tversky & Kahneman (1991), Rabin & Thaler (2001), Koszegi & Rabin (2004), Laibson (1996, 
1997), Ainslie (1991) and Ainslie & Haslam (1992). 
The field has benefited a great deal from another line of research, that is, experimental economics 
and game theory, on such important topics as prosocial behavior, fairness, reciprocity, and altruism. 
These developments are extremely helpful in demonstrating that man’s dispositions are not simply 
self-centered but anchored in social norms of fairness and other-regarding. See Fehr & Gächter 
(2000) for a review of the literature. 
It should also be noted that sociology itself has seen a new development known as rational choice 
theory, which attempts to explain complex social phenomena in terms of rational actions and 
voluntary exchanges of individuals. See Homans (1961), Blau (1964), and Coleman (1973) for an 
early development in 1960s and 1970s, and Coleman (1991). It has brought a new challenge on how 
to reconcile rational actions with socio-cultural norms, a theme of central concern to Parsons 
(1951). Our paper is addressing this challenge by delving into cultural-symbolic expressive 
behavior based on institutionalized dispositions. The novelty of our approach is that we distinguish 
between the rationality based on utility function given a priori and the effective rationality which is 
revealed through a convolution of an effective status emulation pattern and the information on the 
distribution of choice objects in terms of their popularities across social classes. 
iii On this grand beauty of the system, Smith writes: 
.... If we consider the real satisfaction which all these things are capable of affording, by itself and 
separated from the beauty of that arrangement which is fitted to promote it, it will always appear in 
the highest degree contemptible and trifling.  But we rarely view it in this abstract and 
philosophical light. We naturally confound it in our imagination with the order, the regular and 
harmonious movement of the system, the machine or economy by means of which it is produced. 
The pleasures of wealth and greatness, when considered in this complex view, strike the 
imagination as something grand and beautiful and noble, of which the attainment is well worth all 
the toil and anxiety which we are so apt to bestow upon it (MS, p. 263). 
iv Placing Freud’s social theory within the Hobbesian problem of order was criticized by Kaye (1991) 
as a false convergence. The idea that asocial human nature is somehow transformed into a social 
one as individual personality internalizes social and cultural forces into the superego obscures 
Freud’s theory, which is based on the notion of unconscious mental processes driven by ambivalent 
desires subject to the defensive forces of repression (p. 89).  
v The literature on cultural, symbolic, or conspicuous consumption has flourished in recent years. For 
example, see, Lizardo (2008), Han, Nunes, & Dreze (2010), Sweet (2011), Berger, Ho, & Joshi 
(2011), Torelli & Cheng (2011), Firat, Kutucuoglu, ArikanSaltik, & Ungel (2013), Warde (2014), 
Kastanakis & Balabanis (2014), Dubois & Ordabayeva (2015), Deans, Samantha, Daube, 
Derevensky, & Gordon (2016), Pronay & Hetesi (2016), Goldberg, Hannan, & Kovacs (2016), 
Goldberg, Hannan, & Kovacs (2016), Chang, Wang, & Chen (2016) and Torelli, Ahluwalia, Cheng, 
Olson, & Stoner (2017). Our paper differs from these studies in that it attempts to show the 
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